

CHAPTER I

HOME (POLICE) DEPARTMENT

1.1 Modernisation of Police Force

The scheme “Modernisation of Police Force” was revised by GOI with substantial outlay of Central assistance for a ten year period starting from 2000-01 to make good the deficiencies in basic police infrastructure as identified by the Bureau of Police Research and Development. Performance audit of the scheme revealed that the Department did not prepare a long term perspective plan as envisaged in the scheme guidelines. Hence, the scheme was implemented without a long term strategy for strengthening the police force in a systematic manner. Besides, several deficiencies in the area of mobility, weaponry, equipment, communication etc. were noticed. The significant observations noticed are highlighted below:

The Department did not prepare a long term perspective plan as envisaged in the scheme guidelines and the Annual Action Plans were more a list of items for procurement rather than a coherent, well thought out programme of action.

(Paragraph 1.1.7)

There was a shortage of 70 light vehicles in the Battalions as 303 vehicles had been issued to headquarter police units not covered under the modernisation scheme in violation of the norms. Though the Department was holding 61 different types of excess vehicles, the overall shortage of 242 vehicles in the prescribed category was noticed.

(Paragraph 1.1.9)

The objective to provide reliable, uninterrupted and encrypted end to end communication connectivity up to police station level was not achieved even after incurring an expenditure of Rs 3.77 crore.

(Paragraph 1.1.10)

The percentage of shortfall of sophisticated weapons ranged between 94 and 98 per cent in the test-checked police stations. There were also several cases of arms without ammunitions and vice versa apart from short/non accountal of ammunitions.

(Paragraph 1.1.12)

There was lack of sufficient monitoring and evaluation at Departmental and Government level.

(Paragraph 1.1.17)

1.1.1 Introduction

Government of India introduced (1969) the scheme of Modernisation of police Force (MPF) to augment the operational efficiency of the State police so as to face the

emerging challenges to internal security effectively. A revised Scheme involving substantial outlay of Central assistance was launched by the GOI for a ten year period starting from 2000-01 to make good the deficiencies in basic police infrastructure as identified by the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D). Under this revised scheme, the State Governments were required to submit a five-year Perspective Plan on the requirement of the police forces starting from 2000-01 indicating the specific projects, which the Governments want to implement each year. The components covered under the scheme were (a) Construction (residential as well as non-residential buildings) (b) Mobility (c) Weaponry (d) Equipment and (e) Communication system including Computerisation. The GOI also categorized the States into different categories considering the security situation prevalent and Nagaland was categorized under 'A' category from 2006-07, being maximum security threat, and was therefore eligible for 100 *per cent* grants from GOI.

1.1.2 Organisational setup

The State Police Department is headed by the Director General of Police (DGP) who is assisted by two Additional Directors General of Police (ADGP), seven Inspectors General of Police (IG), seven Deputy Inspectors General of Police (DIG), Deputy Director, Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) and 13 Superintendents of Police and 14 Commandants in field formations. The implementation of the scheme is overseen by a State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) headed by the Chief Secretary.

1.1.3 Scope of Audit

The implementation of the scheme relating to the period 2000-01 to 2008-09 was reviewed by a test-check (March-April 2009) of records of the Home Department, DGP, DIG (wireless), DIG (crime) and Deputy Director (FSL). Besides, the records of two out of 14 commandants, five out of 14 Superintendents of Police (Kohima, Mokochung, Dimapur, Nagaland Armed Police Training Centre and Police Training School) and seven out of 48 police stations were also test-checked.

1.1.4 Audit objectives

The audit objectives were to examine and evaluate the:

- efficiency of planning for implementation of various components and major thrust areas of the scheme;
- proper utilization of funds for implementation of the programme;
- implementation of major objectives of the schemes as per norms and targets fixed;
- efforts of the Government to upgrade the skills of the police force, and increase their striking capabilities and
- effectiveness of monitoring mechanism.

1.1.5 Audit criteria

Audit objectives were benchmarked against the following criteria:

- scheme guidelines issued by GOI;
- Norms fixed by BPR&D for various components;
- annual plans prepared by the Department and targets fixed therein;
- prescribed monitoring mechanism.

1.1.6 Audit methodology

The performance audit commenced with an entry conference with the DIG (ADM) (March 2009) wherein the audit objectives, scope and criteria were discussed. Data relating to various prioritised items were analysed apart from test-check of relevant records to arrive at audit conclusions. The audit findings were discussed in an exit conference with the Special Secretary Home (Police) (May 2009) and the replies of the Department have been incorporated in the report appropriately.

Audit findings

1.1.7 Planning

Proper planning is imperative for achieving the objectives of a programme in a systematic and efficient manner. The GOI while approving further continuance of the scheme from 2000-01, felt the need for submission of a five-year plan by the State Government to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) indicating specific projects required to be implemented each year for modernisation of its police force. It was envisaged that the plan would be a coherent, well-thought-out programme of action for upgradation of capabilities in specific areas and should not be a list of items for procurement. Annual plans to be submitted by the States should flow from the five-year plan already submitted.

Scrutiny (March 2009) revealed that the Department did not prepare any long term Perspective Plan for modernisation of police force in the State. The Department however, prepared Annual Action Plans (AAPs) every year. An examination of the AAPs revealed that they were more a list of items for procurement rather than a coherent, well-thought-out programme of action for upgradation of capabilities as was envisaged in GOI scheme guidelines.

Thus, the State Government prepared AAPs as a mere formality every year which were also approved by the MHA. The Department therefore, could not avail the full benefit of the scheme for modernization of police force in the State due to absence of a long-term strategy.

It was also noticed the due date of submission of AAPs by the State Government was fixed at April of the year of the AAP by MHA. The Department submitted AAPs after delay of one month during 2001-09. MHA however, approved the AAPs after considerable delays ranging from two to six months during the period thereby leaving insufficient time at the disposal of the State Government to spend the scheme funds within the year.

The above is indicative of the fact that not only was the timelines prescribed by the MHA defective, the inordinate delays in approval has resulted in leaving insufficient time during the year for the State Government to spend the funds released.

1.1.8 Financial management

The details of plan approved, funds released by GOI, State share and expenditure incurred under the scheme during 2000-09 were as under:

Table-1.1.1

Year	Cost of project as per approved Action Plan			Receipts			Short release of GOI fund (Col.2-5)	GOI release in kind	Expenditure		
	GOI share	GON share	Total	GOI	GON	Total			GOI	GON	Total
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
2000-01	13.50	13.50	27.00	2.84	16.75	19.59	10.66	00	2.84	16.75	19.59
2001-02	13.50	13.50	27.00	13.44	13.50	26.94	0.06	6.16	13.44	13.50	26.94
2002-03	13.50	13.50	27.00	9.81	13.50	23.31	3.69	0.14	9.81	13.50	23.31
2003-04	19.37	6.41	25.78	19.37	6.41	25.78	00	0.10	19.37	6.41	25.78
2004-05	19.50	6.50	26.00	13.08	6.51	19.59	6.42	0.30	13.08	6.51	19.59
2005-06	19.50	6.51	26.01	18.17	6.51	24.68	1.33	0.43	18.17	6.51	24.68
2006-07	22.00	0.00	22.00	22.00	0.00	22.00	0.00	00	22.00	0.00	22.00
2007-08	31.00	0.00	31.00	29.18	0.00	29.18	1.82	0.49	29.18	0.00	29.18
2008-09	37.00	0.00	37.00	37.21	0.00	37.21	0.00	00	31.28	0.00	31.28
TOTAL	188.87	59.92	248.79	165.1	63.18	228.28	23.98	7.62	159.17	63.18	222.35

(Source: GOI sanction/release and Departmental records)

It would be seen from above table that against the total receipt of Rs 228.28 crore for programme implementation during the period from 2000-01 to 2008-09, the Department spent Rs 222.35 crore leaving Rs 5.93 crore as unspent balance as of March 2009. Moreover, GOI also released an amount of Rs. 0.21 crore over and above the sanctioned amount during 2008-09. GOI scheme guidelines stipulate that the States are required to spend the Central grant within a period of 12 months from the date of release. It would be seen from the above table that there was an overall short release of funds of Rs 23.98 crore out of which, Rs.22.16 crore had been deducted by GOI from subsequent releases being the unspent balances during previous years. Thus, due to inability of the Department to spend funds received from the GOI timely, the Department did not receive an amount of Rs. 22.16 crore due to which the Department could not fulfill the housing needs of the police force. Besides, deduction of Rs 1.82 crore towards cost of Arms and ammunition and equipment by GOI during 2007-08 also resulted in shortfall of arms and ammunitions at police stations.

Operational infrastructure

1.1.9 Mobility

Mobility is vital for the efficient and effective performance of duties by the police force in order to achieve reduction in response time to crime. BPR&D prescribed scales of various types of operational vehicles according to local road conditions for

police stations and district armed police battalions to enable them to meet challenges of internal security, environment and law and order situation.

The details of BPR&D norms for holding and actual fleet position in the Department are shown in the table below:

Table-1.1.2

Type of vehicles	Allocation of vehicles as per BPR&D norms				Fleet position of the Department as of April 2009				Excess (+/ Short (-))
	SP/DEF/PS	Battalions	Others	Total	SP/DEF/PS	Battalions	Others	Total	
Light (Gypsy/BP)	357	144	0	501	361	74	210	645	(+) 144
Medium	103	72	0	175	72	77	47	196	(+) 21
Heavy	55	72	0	127	18	68	21	107	(-) 20
M/cycle	240	0	0	240	108	23	25	156	(-) 84
Total	755	288	0	1043	559	242	303	1104	(+) 61

(Source: Departmental figure)

It would be seen from the above table that though the Department was holding 61 different types of excess vehicles, the overall shortage of 242 (1043+303-1104) vehicles in the prescribed category was noticed. There was also a shortage of 70 light vehicles in the battalions and 303 vehicles have been issued to units (PHQ, IRB, NAPTC, PTS, PCS, PCW, CMO, DIG (Wireless), CE (PEP)) not covered under the modernisation scheme in violation of the norms of BPR&D.

It was also noticed that though the Department had adequate number of vehicles, they had skewed the distribution in favour of Headquarters/officers to the detriment of functioning of the field units. Mobility in the fields was stressed owing to diversion of the vehicles to the headquarters.

The Department during exit conference accepted the observations and stated (May 2009) that though the modernisation scheme did not provide for vehicles to Headquarter units of PHQ, they had to allot vehicles to them for their duties.

The above is evidenced from the following observations noticed from a detailed scrutiny of records in the selected districts:

- (i) 160 vehicles were allotted to SP, Kohima district against the norm of 80 vehicles. Out of 160 vehicles, 13 were off-road, 40 vehicles were retained at district headquarters and only 14 vehicles were provided to five PSs against the BPR&D norm of 50 vehicles and 93 vehicles (58 per cent) were deployed for VIP and other duties, not covered under the scheme.
- (ii) 40 Gypsy soft top were procured for 35 Police Stations during 2007-08. However, nine vehicles procured for seven¹ PSs were retained at district headquarters. It was also seen that two police stations viz., Kubulong and Changtongya (under SP, Mokokchung) were running without any kind of vehicle.

¹ New Sectt (Kohima), PS-I and II, Kubulong, Changtongya (Mokokchung), Dimapur West and GRP (Dimapur).

- (iii) The expenditure on repair, replacement and spare parts of the vehicles were to be met from State Plan only and was not permissible from modernisation scheme funds. The Department however, utilised Rs.7.36 crore for this purpose from the funds meant for MPF during 2002-04.

Thus, the objective of increasing the mobility for field policing essential for the performance of the police force had not been achieved.

It is evident that the above would also have an adverse impact on reducing response time, which was one of the objectives of MPF. It was however, seen that the State Government had not fixed any norms for the response time nor did it give any instructions for recording the time of visit of site of offence in the crime diary. During test-check of seven police stations, the time relating to visit of scene of offence by the police personnel was not noted in the crime diary in any of the police stations. The log books of vehicles could also not be produced for verification, though called for in audit. Hence, there was no way to assess whether response time was reduced.

1.1.10 Communication

Satellite based integrated police communication network (POLNET) sanctioned under 10th plan (2002-07) was included in the Annual Plan of the year 2002-03 under police modernisation scheme to provide encrypted voice, data and message communication from the Headquarters office to police station level with the help of Very Small Aperture Terminal (V-SAT) at district headquarters and Multi Access Radio Telephone (MART) at police stations.

The work for execution of POLNET project was awarded (2002) to Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL), Ghaziabad by GOI for completion by March 2005.

A scrutiny of records revealed that though BEL completed installation and commissioning of V-SATs and MART in the State at a cost of Rs. 3.77 crore during 2005-06, the V-SATs were not functional at the district headquarters, Kohima due to non-supply of hardware. The V-SATs at Mokokchung and Dimapur though functional could not be optimally utilized as the MART was not functional in any of police stations due to lack of availability of line of sight².

Thus, the objective to provide reliable, efficient, uninterrupted and encrypted end to end communication connectivity up to police station level was not achieved in the State even after incurring an expenditure of Rs.3.77 crore.

The Department stated (June 2009) that it was not accountable for the expenditure since the project was implemented centrally by GOI.

1.1.11 Common Integrated Police Application System (CIPA)

CIPA was introduced by GOI (2004-05) with a view to record data regarding crime and criminals by computerizing Head office, range offices, SP offices and all police

² Line of sight: Signal/wavelength

stations in the State with online connectivity with each other together with access of data of crime and criminals to/from each other so as to make them available to the public through web based citizen interface on Internet.

The CIPA project was started (2004-05) in the State in a phased manner at 45 places by constructing and renovating the police stations to make them safe and secured which was completed in 2008-09 at a total cost of Rs.7.73 crore.

A scrutiny of records however, revealed that CIPA could not be made functional in four police stations taken up in the first phase in the State even after expending a further amount of Rs. 1.23 crore on accessories due to improper design of the software installed.

It was further noticed that the Department, procured materials worth Rs. 88.82 lakh (server, LAN etc.) during 2006-07 for installation in 15 police stations in order to provide internet facility. However, internet facility had not been provided (April 2009) in the four police stations where CIPA had been installed. Besides, materials worth Rs. 41.45 lakh despatched by PHQ were not received in the seven test-checked police stations (April 2009). This point towards suspected misappropriation of the material.

Thus, the objective to connect the police stations to access crime and criminal data so as to make them available to the public through web based citizen interface on Internet by means of CIPA system remained un-achieved even after spending Rs. 9.85 crore.

The Department accepted (June 2009) the observation but the reply was silent regarding misappropriation of materials.

1.1.12 Weaponry

One of the major objectives of the scheme was to increase the striking capabilities of the police force. This was all the more essential in a State like Nagaland as the State was declared 'A' category by the GOI, being maximum security threat. In order to enhance the striking capabilities of the force, upgradation and sufficient supply of weaponry to the force was a very important aspect. A scrutiny of records in this regard revealed the following:

(i) *Replacement of outdated weapons:* The Department envisaged replacement of the existing .303 rifles by modern sophisticated weapons such as 7.62 mm SLR, AK-47 and 5.56 mm INSAS. It was seen from the issue and custody register of sophisticated weaponry that out of 8841 sophisticated weapons held by the Department, 4,562 weapons (52 *per cent*) were issued to the Indian Reserve Battalions (IRB). The corresponding 14741 numbers of magazines were also issued to the IRBs. Since IRBs did not come under the purview of the scheme, issue of arms and magazines worth Rs.11.23 crore to them was not justified.

The actual distribution of sophisticated weaponry in the seven test-checked police stations as compared to BPR&D norms is detailed in the table below:

Table- 1.1.3

Type of weapons	Strength			Requirement as per BPR&D	Holding position	Shortfall	Percentage of shortfall
	HC	Constables	Total				
SLR 7.62/INSAS 5.56	31	332	363	266	16	250	94
AK 47				97	2	95	98
Total	31	332	363	363	18	345	95

(Source: Departmental figure)

The above table reveals that the percentage of shortfall of sophisticated weapons ranged between 94 and 98 per cent in the test-checked police stations itself. This clearly points to the diversion of sophisticated weapons to Indian Reserve Battalions depriving the State police of the weapons.

While accepting, the Department stated (June 2009) that the weaponry issued to IRBs would be taken back in a phased manner in the coming years and the shortfall at the police station level arose due to issue of weaponry to the IRBs.

(ii) Arms without ammunition and vice versa: Scrutiny of stock register maintained in the Police Central Store (PCS), Chumukedima revealed that arms without ammunitions and ammunitions without arms were lying in the store for periods ranging from four to sixteen years as detailed in the table below:

Table-1.1.4

Year of purchase	Type of ammunition	Stock (rounds)	Required type of arms	Stock (No)	Year of purchase	Type of arms	Stock (No.)	Required type of ammunition	Stock (rounds)
1996	.410 buckshot	522013	.410 musket	0	1993	51" Mortar gun	10	Bomb against mortar 51	0
	.410 blank	52370	.410 musket	0	2005		12 bore pump action gun		5
	.410 ball	217893	.410 musket	0					100
	.455 revolver ammunition	828851	.455 pistol	0					
	.455 blank	100	.455 pistol	0					
	4 second detonator	55106	No.36 Grenade	0					

(Source: Departmental figure)

The Department stated (April 2009) that the required arms had not been procured because the ammunitions were outdated and the required ammunitions had not been procured because the Central Police Store had not requisitioned for them.

(iii) Non accountal of returned ammunition: 2,000 rounds of cartridges SA .22 balls were taken (June 2003) on loan from PCS Chumukedima, by the Nagaland State Rifle Association and returned back in September 2003. However, it was neither accounted for nor available in stock which points towards doubt on pilferage, misuse of ammunition.

(iv) Outstanding position of ammunition issued on loan basis: It was seen that Short Range Shell (600), Dual Shell (500), MK IV Grenade (700) and Three way Grenade (550) were issued to DIGP, Manipur on loan basis on two occasions

(October 2003 and July 2004). Of this, Grenade (198) and Duel Shell (240) only were received back till date (April 2009). The remaining ammunitions were not yet received back. The Department has not taken any follow up action to get back the ammunitions issued on loan basis even after six years.

(v) Short accountal of ammunitions: Annual physical verification of arms and ammunitions at the unit levels is required to be conducted by a Committee constituted by the Department. The Committee has to submit its report showing details of stock position along with its remarks, to the competent authority. Ammunitions stored at PCS, Chumukedima had never been physically verified till date (April 2009). Scrutiny of the records revealed that there were differences in figures of receipt between PHQ and PCS of 3,10,747 rounds of ammunitions of different categories from 2003-04 onwards as detailed below:

Table- 1.1.5

Particulars	Receipts as per PHQ					Actual receipt as per PCS as of March 2009	Difference
	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	Total		
7.62 BDR	1,00,000	2,00,000	2,00,000	300000	8,00,000	7,06,666	93,334
9mm Ball	1,00,000	1,00,000	50,000	0	2,50,000	2,20,504	29,496
303 BDR	1,00,000	2,00,000	1,00,000	200000	6,00,000	5,49,600	50,400
303 CTN	10,0,000	1,00,000	1,00,000	90000	3,90,000	3,52,483	37,517
7.62 CTN	0	50,000	50,000	100000	2,00,000	1,00,000	1,00,000
Total	4,00,000	6,50,000	5,00,000	6,90,000	22,40,000	19,29,253	31,07,47

(Source: Departmental figure)

The Department stated (June 2009) that action has been initiated to verify the position by a committee headed by IG/DIG. The results shall be communicated after completion of the inquiry. Further development is awaited.

Thus, it is evident from the above that the Department had not fared well in the area of enhancing the striking capabilities of the police force in the State as envisaged in the scheme guidelines.

1.1.13 Equipment

The Police Central Workshop (PCW) was functioning for repair of all classes of vehicles of the Police Department. The Department in their AAP of 2002-03 proposed to modernize the PCW with the objective to avoid the delays in repair and also to execute the repairing work economically. Audit scrutiny revealed:

- (i) The supplier did not install two sets of equipment (Paint booth) procured in July 2004 for Rs 33 lakh even after a delay of seven years (April 2009). Though as per the terms and conditions with the supplier, the payment had to be released only after the installation, the Department released the payment to the supplier on receipt of the equipment.
- (ii) One set each of Computerized wheel aligner CCD video graphic and Computerised Engine analyzer valuing Rs 25 lakh were installed in June 2004. The equipment was out of order from June 2007 as the computers attached to the machines crashed due to power fluctuation. Besides, most of the vehicles in the

State were non carburetor/Multiple Point Fuel injection system and as such the necessity for its purchase was not justified. Thus, the Department functioned manually even after spending Rs 25 lakh for modernizing the function.

- (iii) A Cold Process tyre retreading machine valuing Rs 12 lakh was procured in March 2004. But the machine could not be utilized as the building to house the machine had not been completed. The building was completed and the machine finally installed in January 2009. However, no retreading work had been allocated to the workshop till date (April 2009).

Thus, it is evident that the objective of the Department in modernizing the PCW to avoid delays and to execute the repairing work economically remained un-achieved even after incurring an expenditure of Rs 70 lakh.

1.1.14 Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL)

The scheme objectives envisaged strengthening of Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) by inducting modern equipment to reduce the delay in settling of crime cases in the State.

An amount of Rs.3.12 crore was spent during the period from 2001-2009 towards equipment and chemicals to support and modernize the FSL division, out of which accessories worth Rs.74.59 lakh purchased during 2007-08 have not been installed. Further, accessories worth Rs.29.63 lakh procured during 2008-09 had not been dispatched by PHQ to FSL, Dimapur till March 2009.

Scrutiny of records disclosed that:

- (i) In NARCOTICS wing, though modern equipment worth Rs.45.01 lakh were installed during 2002-07, the chemicals to support the testing of samples of drugs were not procured till April 2009 due to non release of fund by the State. Hence, the equipment was lying idle.
- (ii) BALLISTIC CAMPARISON cell was established for microscopic comparison of fired ammunition or gun to match the equipment or ammunition in a scientific method. Equipment namely, LEICA DMC-Basic system ballistic comparison microscope for fired ammunition part and tool mart was procured for Rs.17.38 lakh and installed in the wing in October 2003. There was only one officer posted in the cell who was trained from NICFS, New Delhi. Due to the transfer of the officer and non availability of any other trained manpower, the cell remained non-functional since August 2007.
- (iii) Though equipment such as Digital cameras, Computer accessories, video cameras, projectors, TV/DVD under modernization were installed in Photography Division during the period 2001-08, no case was ever referred by Investigating Officer (IO) and PS to the Division. Therefore, the Division remained non-functional.

(iv) MOBILE FSL UNITS were constituted by the Department in nine districts in the State. These units were provided with accessories to function as a mini FSL unit in the district. These units were also entrusted to collect the scientific evidence of crime data for documentation in FSL. However, data were not received in the FSL, Dimapur from any mobile FSL unit. The test-checked units also did not furnish the logbooks of the Mobile FSL units.

Thus, it is evident that the objective of strengthening of FSL to reduce the delay in settling of crime cases in the State had not been achieved.

The Department accepted (June 2009) the observations.

Human Resource Development and Infrastructure

1.1.15 Training

Training assumes utmost importance to improve the striking capabilities and other operational efficiencies of the police force to prepare them to tackle the insurgency situation in the State. Scrutiny of records revealed the following:

(i) **Basic training programmes:** There are two training centers viz., Nagaland Armed Police Training Centre (NAPTC) and Police Training School (PTS) in the State which are responsible for imparting training to all cadres of Police. PTS conducted training programmes without any calendar of training since 2001. Hence, the number of personnel planned to be trained vis-à-vis achievement could not be assessed. NAPTC conducted training programme on the basis of calendar of training from 2003. The details are shown below:

Table-1.1.6

Year	No. of training programme planned	No. of training programme cancelled	No. of training programme conducted	Percentage of cancelled programmes	Capacity of training programme	No. of persons trained	Percentage of untrained personnel
2003	12	8	4	67	790	359	55
2004	17	10	7	59	1,080	381	65
2005	16	10	6	63	980	457	53
2006	12	4	8	33	754	569	25
2007	12	6	6	50	927	900	03
2008	10	6	4	60	1510	260	83
2009	8	3	5*	38	1310	657	50
Total	87	47	40	54	7,351	3,583	51

**Under progress*

(Source: Departmental figures)

The requirement of staff for the institute as per BPR&D norms was 280. However, there was a shortage of 90 (32 per cent) in different cadres which was communicated to DGP in November 2006. But no action was initiated to appoint the staff to run the NAPTC. This had resulted in cancellation of 54 per cent of the training programmes and therefore 3,768 personnel in the force though identified for training remained untrained.

(ii) **Basic training programmes to women cadre:** During 2005-09, only 33 out of 185 recruited women constables were imparted basic training organised by the centres. Thus, there was a shortfall of 152 (82 *per cent*) in basic training and 185 (100 *per cent*) in other types of training.

(iii) **Computerised training aids (Simulators):** A Computerised Firing Range was procured for Rs.40 lakh and installed in NAPTC in December 2006. Scrutiny revealed that training was organized in 2007 for 118 police personnel in 10 batches and thereafter, no training was organized to utilize the equipment.

Interactive Fire Arm Training Simulators and accessories worth rupees one crore was received at both the training Centers in March 2007 and their installation completed after a delay of one year. However, the Department did not organise any training in the modern simulated environment.

Four sets of Zen Grenade hand simulators were procured during 2007-08 to provide necessary exposure and practice on use of modern techniques at a cost of Rs.29.04 lakh (unit cost: Rs.7.26 lakh). Out of this, one set each had been issued (November 2007) to NAPTC and PTS. The simulator sets had however, not been installed till date (April 2009)

(iv) **Annual Classification Firing:** Annual Classification Firing (ACF) for all units is very important and need to be carried out once in a year for maintaining firing capability of police personnel from professional point of view. It was however, noticed in the test checked units that the deficit in ACF ranged between 38 to 88 *per cent* due to the shortfall of ammunitions with the units.

The Department stated (June 2009) that the shortfall was due to late receipt of ammunitions from the Ordnance Factories.

It is evident from the above observations that the training needs of the police force could not be fully addressed by the Department.

1.1.16 Housing

The scheme laid special emphasis on construction of residential and non-residential buildings with a view to providing a better working environment to the police personnel. The National Police Commission had also recommended (1977) hundred per cent accommodation for police personnel. Against the requirement of 14,843 quarters for lower and upper subordinates (Type-I to Type-III) at the beginning of 2001, the Department proposed construction of 425 staff quarters in the AAPs for the period 2001-2009, out of which 370 were completed. It was also noticed that the Department could achieve an overall housing satisfaction level of only 15 *per cent* for its force. Audit scrutiny revealed the following:

(i) **Expenditure beyond purview:** The Department spent the entire State's matching share for the scheme of Rs.6.51 crore during 2005-06 on construction and other related works of 9th and 10th Indian Reserve Battalions in the State. Moreover, this was in violation of decision of the Empowered Committee which specifically

forbade the Department from incurring any expenditure on Indian Reserve Battalion as they did not come under the purview of the scheme. This was not only irregular but was also grave in view of the fact that the Department could achieve only 15 per cent housing satisfaction level for its own force. The Department accepted (June 2009) the observation.

(ii) *Non-occupation of completed Outpost building:* The Department completed construction of an outpost police station at Zubza during 2003-04 at a cost of Rs.10 lakh. The building was physically handed over to the Superintendent of Police (SP), Kohima only in May 2008 i.e. after a delay of more than four years for reasons not on record. The building was however, unfit for occupation due to non-provision of security fencing, shattered window panes, lack of water and sanitation facilities, non provision of locking mechanism and also did not have accessibility by road. Hence, the Outpost police station building remained unoccupied till date (May 2009) resulting in unfruitful expenditure of Rs.10 lakh.

While accepting, the Department stated (June 2009) that proposals have been included for construction of permanent fencing in the coming year to make the OP functional.

(iii) *Unauthorised expenditure on construction and renovation:* As per BPR&D norms, construction and renovation of quarters of Type IV and above were not permissible under the scheme. Scrutiny however, revealed that the Department spent Rs 1.30 crore during 2006-08 for civil works of construction and renovation of type IV and V quarters thus depriving the lower subordinate staff of quarters.

The Department stated (June 2009) that some residential buildings were constructed to accommodate officers to have proper command on jawans. But the fact however, remains that this was not permissible under the scheme.

It is evident from the above observations that the Department could not fulfill the housing needs of its force to provide better environment for the police personnel.

1.1.17 Monitoring and evaluation

State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) was required to meet every month to monitor the preparation of AAPs for submission to MHA and implementation of approved AAPs. As against 96 meetings required to be held during the eight year period 2001-2009, SLEC met only eight times. Neither the State Government nor the Department had formulated any system to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the programme at their level periodically. Thus, there was lack of sufficient monitoring and evaluation at departmental and Government level.

1.1.18 Conclusion

The scheme 'Modernisation of Police Force' was implemented in the State without a long term Perspective Plan as envisaged in guidelines and distribution of vehicles was skewed in favour of Headquarters/officers to the detriment of the field units. Though

the State had been declared 'A' category by the Government of India, being maximum security threat, the Department had not endeavoured to gear up its weaponry to face the threat. The satellite based integrated Police Communication Network and Common Integrated Police Application system were not functioning in the State and Forensic Science Laboratory was not functioning in a modern environment. The training and housing needs of the force had not been adequately addressed by the Department and there was lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanism.

1.1.19 Recommendations

- The Department should prepare a long term strategy which should form the basis for the Annual Action Plans;
- Vehicles as prescribed by Bureau of Police Research and Development should be issued to field units for betterment of field duties;
- The Department should strive to upgrade its weaponry with modern sophisticated arms at the police station level;
- The training needs of the force to keep abreast with the latest tools and technology should be adequately addressed;
- The housing needs of the force should be fulfilled to provide better environment;
- Monitoring and Evaluation mechanism may be streamlined to ensure proper implementation of the various components under modernization of police force.

IRRIGATION AND FLOOD CONTROL DEPARTMENT

1.2 Implementation of Irrigation Schemes

The Government of India introduced two schemes viz., Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (funded by NABARD) and Non-Lapsable Central Pool of Resources in 1996-97 and 2000-01 respectively and the Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Programme (AIBP) in 1999-2000 with the main aim of facilitating investment for improving infrastructure in agriculture and completion of projects delayed on account of financial constraints. A performance audit of the schemes revealed that the stated objectives could not be achieved due to delay/non-release of State share, lack of effective planning, diversion of funds and deficient management of available resources. The major observations noticed are detailed below:

Lack of proper planning resulted in non-completion/abandonment of projects.

(Paragraph 1.2.7)

Against the target to irrigate 47,175 hectares of land during 1996-2009 under three schemes, the Department could cover only 36851 hectares resulting in shortfall of 10,324 hectares (21.88 per cent).

(Paragraph 1.2.9)

The Executive Engineer, Mokokchung Division, paid Rs.3.86 crore to a contractor based on fictitious measurements recorded in the MBs.

(Paragraph 1.2.9 (A) (i))

The Department targeted creation of irrigation potential of 48,939 hectares by 2008-09 but achieved only 36,087 hectares. Out of potential created, only 23,419 hectares could be utilized as most of the projects had been stated to have been completed with the available funds partially resulting in availability of water to lesser number of beneficiaries.

(Paragraph 1.2.10)

1.2.1 Introduction

The State of Nagaland has an area of 16,579 sq. km. with a total population of 20 lakh (2001 census) and 73 per cent of them are engaged in agriculture. The terrain is mostly hilly and shifting cultivation (jhum) and terrace farming is widely practiced. The system of landholding is different from other parts of the country and most of the land, rivers, streams and forests especially in rural areas are either owned by individuals or the community, village or clans.

The topography of the State does not allow for major or medium irrigation projects. Minor irrigation projects are, therefore, the only alternative which suits the local conditions. The State has a total cultivable area of 7,21,924 hectares (43.54 per cent³) out of which 3,85,060 hectares (53 per cent⁴) are under crop production. The net irrigated area is 75,800 hectares and the total area which needs irrigation is 1,65,000 hectares.

The Government of India (GOI) introduced Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Programme (AIBP) in Nagaland during 1999-2000 with the target to irrigate 39,443 hectares of potential land. The GOI also introduced two schemes i.e., Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) in 1996-97 and Non-Lapsable Central Pool of Resources (NLCPR) in 2000-01 under which irrigation was also included with the target to irrigate 6148 hectares and 1584 hectares of land respectively in the State.

1.2.2 Organizational set up

³ Percentage to total area

⁴ Percentage to total cultivable area

The Irrigation and Flood Control Department (I&FCD) is headed by a Secretary. The Directorate of the Department is headed by a Chief Engineer (CE), who is responsible for planning, programme implementation and monitoring of the schemes and projects and is assisted by one Additional Chief Engineer (Addl. CE). A Superintending Engineer (SE) assisted by an Executive Engineer (EE) and a Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) is in charge of the Minor Irrigation schemes at the Directorate level. At the Divisional level, eight EEs and three (SDOs) are responsible for implementation of MI schemes. The EEs are assisted by 12 SDOs.

1.2.3 Scope of audit

A performance audit of the MI projects since inception⁵ to 2008-09 was taken up between April-July 2009 through test-check of records of five divisions⁶ and one sub-division⁷ under which 593 projects are being implemented, covering 60 *per cent* (Rs.80.21 crore) of the total expenditure of Rs.134.28 crore. Out of this, records in respect of 42 projects were scrutinized and joint physical verification of 18⁸ selected projects (Random Sampling Method) was carried out.

1.2.4 Audit objectives

The Audit objectives were to assess whether:

- the main objectives of creating the envisaged irrigation potential have been achieved;
- effective planning mechanism existed;
- adequate funds were released in time and utilized properly;
- individual projects were executed in an economic, effective and efficient manner;
- monitoring mechanism was adequate and effective.

1.2.5 Audit Criteria

Audit objectives were benchmarked against the following criteria:

- Detailed Project Report of selected projects;
- guidelines of the schemes issued by GOI;
- prescribed monitoring and evaluation system.

1.2.6 Audit methodology

An entry conference was held on 22 April 2009 with the Secretary and Chief Engineer of the Department wherein the audit objectives, criteria, scope of audit and methodology were explained. Performance audit was conducted through an examination and analysis of records, collection of information through questionnaires and joint physical verification of selected projects. An exit conference was held on 8 September 2009 with the concerned departmental officers wherein audit findings were

⁵ RIDF: 1996-97, AIBP: 1999-2000 and NLCPR: 2000-2001

⁶ Kohima, Dimapur, Mokokchung, Tuensang and Phek

⁷ Kiphire

⁸ 6 AIBP and 12 Non-AIBP

discussed. The report was finalised after taking into account the views of the Department.

Audit Findings

1.2.7 Planning

The Department was required to conduct preliminary studies and collect general data through survey and investigation for each individual project and the provisional selection of projects were to be based on the Preliminary Survey Report. Thereafter, preliminary project reports and detailed project reports were to be prepared and approved by the competent authority. All the components of the project including land were to be assessed correctly at the planning stage itself. It was, however, seen during physical verification that five projects, though shown as completed in the departmental records, were incomplete/abandoned due to land disputes. The Department did not address these issues at the planning stage resulting in delay in completion/abandonment of the projects.

As per the AIBP guidelines, only minor irrigation projects listed in the annual work plan should be taken up for execution in a panel year. It was, however, seen that a project⁹ not included in the approved list of AIBP projects was taken up during 2005-06 and the total State share of Rs.2 crore released during the year was utilized against this project itself. The Department could not furnish any reasons for prioritizing this project at the expense of the listed projects. This indicates deficiency in the planning process and deprived the beneficiaries of the listed projects.

As per AIBP guidelines, well equipped laboratory and technical personnel are to be made available for exercising quality control and periodical appraisal of such data for effective improvement in quality control and construction techniques. However, no separate quality control cell and laboratory exists in the Department for ensuring quality control.

1.2.8 Financial Management

A total amount of Rs.135.10 crore was received from the Government of India as Central Loan Assistance during 1999-2009 in respect of AIBP against which the State Government was supposed to release Rs.22.87 crore¹⁰ being its share. The State Government, however, released only Rs.15.33 crore resulting in short release of Rs.7.54 crore.

Rs.13.82 crore was received from NABARD as loan during 1996-2007 for implementation of schemes under Rural Infrastructure Development Fund. However, the State Government did not release its share of Rs.1.38 crore.

⁹ Sethikema Multipurpose Project

¹⁰ 25 per cent during 1999-2000 to 2005-06 and 10 per cent during 2006-07 to 2008-09.

A total amount of Rs.7.99 crore was received from the Government of India as Central Loan Assistance during 2000-09 in respect of MI projects under Non-Lapsable Central Pool of Resources. The State Government, however, released only Rs.0.32 crore during 2007-09 against its due share of Rs.0.69 crore¹¹.

Thus, the State Government did not release its share of Rs.9.29 crore resulting in several projects being completed much below the estimated cost. It was noticed that though the physically verified projects were stated to have been completed, several components of work as envisaged in the estimates were not even taken up indicating that the projects were only completed partially. This resulted in these projects remaining inoperative and deprived the beneficiaries of the intended benefits.

(i) Delay in release of fund: As per guidelines, State Government should release the grant/loan component to the project authorities immediately in respect of RIDF, within 30 days in respect of NLCPR and within 15 days in respect of AIBP of its release by the Government of India/NABARD. Scrutiny revealed that there were delays ranging from 10 to 225 days, 43 to 123 days and 436 days in release of funds by State Government in respect of AIBP, RIDF and NLCPR respectively. This impacted the timely completion of the schemes.

The Department accepted (September 2009) the facts.

(ii) Parking of fund: Rule 290 of Central Treasury Rules restrict the drawal of money from the treasury unless it is required for immediate disbursement. Government of Nagaland accorded Expenditure Sanction and Drawal Authority (March 2009) for Rs.32.47 crore for implementation of 167 MI projects under AIBP and NLCPR schemes in the State.

Scrutiny of records of the CE revealed that Rs.32.47 crore were drawn for implementation of various schemes during the year 2008-09 and kept in Civil Deposit as shown below:

¹¹ 10 per cent during 2007-08 and 2008-09.

Table 1.2.1

Year	Date of release by GOI	Date of deposit in Civil Deposit	Amount (Rupees in crore)	Name of scheme
2008-09	23.03.2009	31.03.09	27.21	AIBP
2008-09	20.12.2007	30.03.09	5.26	NLCPR
Total			32.47	

(Source: Departmental records)

Funds were drawn at the fag end of the financial year and kept in Civil Deposit as per the orders of the Finance Department. The amount kept in Civil Deposit was also reported as expenditure thereby inflating the expenditure figures during the year. This also resulted in erosion of accountability and legislative control over expenditure, as drawal from civil deposits during subsequent years will neither require legislative approval nor will the expenditure incurred be subject to legislative authority through the appropriation mechanism. Thus, using the facility of transfer credit from the consolidated fund to the civil deposit violated the basic principles of legislative control over State finances. Besides, the funds parked in Civil Deposit impacted the programme implementation.

(iii) Diversion of Fund: As per the General Terms and Conditions laid down under Rural Infrastructure Development Fund-VI (RIDF-VI), no administrative expenses of the State Government can be reimbursed from the sanctioned amount of NABARD loan for the project. Further, the Government of Nagaland shall utilize the loan amount solely and exclusively for the purpose for which it was sanctioned by NABARD.

Scrutiny of records, however, revealed that out of Rs.13.82 crore sanctioned by NABARD, the Department expended Rs.0.48 crore for purchase of vehicles, POL, repair of vehicles, procurement of computers and accessories, procurement of furniture, payment of T.A. Bills, etc.

While accepting, the Department stated (September 2009) that the expenditure was incurred for successful implementation and supervision of the schemes.

1.2.9 Programme implementation

The total area to be covered by the Department during the period 1996-2009 was 47175 hectares. The scheme-wise targets and achievements are detailed below:

Table 1.2.2

(Area in Hectares)

Name of Scheme	Year	Target	Achievement	Shortfall
AIBP	2000-01 to 2008-09	39,443	31,337	8,106 (20.55)
NABARD	1996-97 to 2007-08	6,148	4,356	1,792 (29.15)
NLCPR	2001-02 to 2008-09	1,584	1,158	426 (26.89)
Total		47,175	36,851	10,324 (21.88)

Source: Departmental figures (Figures in parenthesis indicate percentages)

A total of 1,194 MI projects had been taken up in Nagaland during the period 1996-2009. Out of this, 1,017 projects were completed as per departmental records. Out of 593 projects taken up in the test-checked divisions, 468 were completed, 123 were in progress and 2 were abandoned. Audit selected 18 projects to physically verify the claims of the Department. Of these 18 projects, 14 were stated to be completed and 4 were in progress. However, it was seen during physical verification that 7 projects were incomplete and one project was abandoned. Thus, the departmental records are not reliable.

(A) Projects under AIBP

A total of nine projects under AIBP were physically verified in audit and the following deficiencies in implementation were noticed:

(i) **Payment made without actual execution of work:** Government of Nagaland accorded Administrative Approval and Expenditure Sanction for Rs.3.58 crore in three installments for construction of “Tsutsung MI project” during 2007-08. The Executive Engineer, I&FC Division, Mokokchung awarded the work at a cost of Rs.3.58 crore to the President, Tsutsung Water User Association. It was also seen that the CE had approved (December 2008) a supplementary estimate for additional work of cement concrete channel lining amounting to Rs.0.28 crore.

As per entries made in the MB, the work commenced in January 2008 and was completed in November 2008 at a cost of Rs.3.86 crore and the contractor was paid in full (March 2008¹² and March 2009¹³). However, joint spot verification (May 2009) of the project by the audit team along with the departmental officers, revealed that only the concrete channel work had been started (May 2009). A photograph of the project is given below:



Photograph showing the present status of the Tsutsung MI project (May 2009)

Thus, the department had made payment of Rs.3.86 crore to the contractor based on fictitious measurement recorded in the MB without actual execution of the work.

¹² Rs.1.68 crore

¹³ Rs.2.18 crore

The Department stated (September 2009) that the amount is parked with the EE (I&FC), Mokokchung as the work was delayed due to onset of monsoon. The Department's reply was totally baseless as payment of Rs.3.86 crore to the contractor had been recorded in the Cash Book between June 2008 and July 2009 and the related actual payees receipts were also produced to audit.

(ii) Unfruitful and doubtful expenditure: 'Chathe (A&B) MI projects' at Razaphema village under Dimapur division was taken up during 2001-2002 at an estimated cost of Rs.0.85 crore. However, only the DPR of 'Chathe Irrigation Project at Razaphema' with an estimated cost of Rs.0.50 crore was furnished to audit.

Joint verification (June 2009) of the Project by the Audit team along with the departmental officials, revealed that only channel work valued at Rs.0.20 crore was completed. On query, it was stated that the work could not be completed as the land owner did not allow construction of 'Head Works'. Thus, the expenditure of Rs.0.20 crore was unfruitful.

Scrutiny further revealed that an amount of Rs.0.25 crore was spent against another project not included in the annual approved list of projects viz., 'Chathe B' purportedly being executed below Patkai Bridge. The DPR of the project could not be furnished despite requisition. Besides, the Department could not identify the exact location of the project during joint physical verification. It was also confirmed from records that the project stated to be Chathe B was actually Chathe Irrigation Project, Chumukedima taken up under AIBP during 2003-04 at a total cost of Rs.1.53 crore. Thus, the expenditure of Rs.0.25 crore was incurred on a virtually non-existent project and the possibility of misappropriation cannot be ruled out.

The Department stated (September 2009) that the scheme consists of two projects in cluster as A&B. It was further stated that in case of Chathe B, only channel work was completed at a cost of Rs.0.25 crore, as a bigger dam was mooted to cover more area. But the fact remains that the channel stated to have been constructed already existed under an earlier project¹⁴.

(iii) Unproductive Expenditure on abandoned work: The scheme 'Nyapongsum MI Project' was taken up under AIBP for irrigation of 40 hectares of land under Tuensung Division with an estimated cost of Rs.35 lakh. The work commenced in December 2005 and was discontinued after payment of rupees eight lakh on a request made by the villagers to shift the project to the down stream to cover more Culturable Command Area (CCA). Accordingly, the Department initiated another project in the name of Nyapongsum Phase II with an estimated cost of Rs.82 lakh to cover 130 hectares. Thus, execution of the project without proper survey and planning led to unproductive expenditure of rupees eight lakh.

(iv) Damage of dam due to defective work: The work 'Yiedi MI project' under AIBP was taken up by the Executive Engineer, IFC Kohima Division during the year 2001-02 at an estimated cost of Rs.0.33 crore. It was seen that the project was

¹⁴ Chathe Irrigation Project, Chumukedima

completed at a cost of Rs.0.20 crore (February 2004). During spot verification by the audit team (May 2009) with the departmental officers, it was seen that the diversion weir and the check gate had completely collapsed and had not been repaired till date. A photograph of the project is given below:



Photograph shows the present status of 'Yiedi' MI project (May 2009)

Thus, it is evident that the Department did not properly monitor the works and compromised on the quality resulting in damage of the dam. The objective of irrigating 55 hectares of land belonging to 380 households also remained unfulfilled.

(B) Projects under RIDF

A total of nine projects out of a total of 57 projects under RIDF were physically verified in audit and the following deficiencies in implementation were noticed:

(i) Unproductive implementation of project: Sheyong M.I. Project at Sathakur village was constructed at an estimated cost of Rs.63 lakh under RIDF to cover 70 hectares of land. Work Order was issued in November 2003 with the stipulation that the work be completed within 6 months from the date of issue of the order. As per entries made in the MB, the work commenced in September 2002 and was completed at a cost of Rs.63 lakh in January 2006.

However, on physical verification (June 2009) by the Audit team along with the departmental officials it was noticed that (i) Check Dam, (ii) Junction Tank, (iii) Desilting Tank, (iv) Diversion Weir cum Intake Well, and (v) Water Harvesting Pond worth Rs.16 lakh had not been constructed and therefore the project had not been completed and water could not be supplied to 70 hectares of land for irrigation. A photograph of the project is given below:



Photograph shows the present position of the Sheyong MI project under RIDF.

(ii) Unfruitful expenditure: The work of “Tsashe M.I. Project” at Nokyan village at Tuensang District at an estimated cost of Rs. 50 lakh was taken up in February 2000 with the objective to irrigate 250 hectares. Scrutiny revealed that the project was certified to have been completed at a total cost of Rs.16 lakh. Joint spot verification by the Audit team along with the departmental officials (June 2009) revealed that construction of RCC Tank, drop structure and laying of G.I. Pipes connecting the command area had not been taken up. Thus, the amount of Rs.16 lakh spent on the project was unfruitful and the beneficiaries were deprived of the benefits of the project.

(iii) Damage due to defective work: The construction of ‘Lamong M.I Project’ under RIDF was taken up during 1999-2000 with an estimated cost of Rs.1.80 crore covering 80 hectares of CCA under Noklak Block. The main diversion weir was constructed on Lamong river consisting of 2 channels on the right and left bank covering 46 hectares of CCA. A second diversion weir was constructed on the river Koimong having one channel covering 34 hectares of CCA. A total amount of Rs.1.10 crore¹⁵ (December 2001 and April 2002) was incurred for the project.

In the DPR it was claimed that the diversion weir shall last for fifty years as the sites were stable and hard shale existed in the bed. However, during joint physical verification (June 2009) by Audit team and the officials from the Division, it was noticed that the main diversion weir on Lamong river was damaged. It was stated by the departmental officials that the damage had occurred during 2007. Thus, water could not be fed to the CCA through the two channels and the farmers were deprived of the benefit of irrigation since 2007. However, no steps had been taken by the Department to renovate/repair the damaged weir even after a lapse of two years. A photograph of the same is given below:

¹⁵ 1st RA Rs.23 lakh + 2nd RA Rs.87 lakh



Photographs shows the present position of the Lamong MI project under RIDF.

Thus, the department did not properly monitor the work and exercise mandatory checks on quality of materials used resulting in damage of the dam and depriving the beneficiaries of the intended benefits.

While accepting, the Department stated (September 2009) that restoration work will be taken up at the earliest.

(iv) Incomplete project: The Thizuru M.I. project under RIDF was taken up by the Department during 1999-2000 with an estimated cost of Rs.32 lakh having a command area of 110 hectares. The project involved laying of G.I pipes (50 mm) for 11.78 km. and construction of three Reservoirs cum distributor tanks. The work was completed during 2002 at a total cost of Rs.20 lakh.

Joint physical verification by the Audit team and departmental officials (May 2009) revealed that the construction of the main reservoir cum distribution tank was incomplete and G.I pipes had not been fitted into the distributors. Besides, due to land dispute, the land owner had stopped the water supply from the primary source since 2003.

The Department had not taken any steps to resolve the land dispute and complete the remaining works. Thus, the objectives of irrigating 110 hectares remained unachieved and the expenditure of Rs.20 lakh incurred on the project was unfruitful.

The Department stated (September 2009) that the settlement of land dispute is taking longer than expected and that the cultivators have agreed to complete the distributary system from the main reservoir and maintain it themselves as soon as the dispute is settled. They further stated that the project is completed but not functional pending settlement of land dispute. A photograph of the project is given below:



Photograph showing the present status of Main reservoir cum distributor of Thizuru project

1.2.10 Impact assessment

The Department targeted creation of irrigation potential of 48,939 ha. by 2008-09 but achieved only 36,087 ha. Out of the potential created, only 23,419 ha. could be utilized as most of the projects were stated to have been completed with the available funds partially resulting in availability of water to lesser number of beneficiaries. Scrutiny of records of the 42 selected projects revealed that out of CCA of 4,434 ha., potential of 3,786 ha. was created out of which only 2376 ha. could be utilized. However, physical verification of 18 projects revealed that several projects which were incomplete/abandoned were shown as completed/in progress and irrigation potential created/utilised. Besides, partial implementation of projects and terming them complete has cast a doubt on the departmental records which could not be relied upon for any analysis of impact of the projects on agricultural productivity, creation of irrigation potential or benefit derived by beneficiaries.

1.2.11 Participatory Irrigation Management

Non- levy of water charges: According to GOI guidelines operative from 1 February 2002, the 'Reforming States' in special category including Nagaland will be provided Central assistance in full without any State's share if they rationalize their water rates in such a way that full operation and maintenance cost of the irrigation projects are recovered in 5 years.

The Department however, did not levy water charges from the users and incurred an expenditure of Rs.0.49 crore towards operation and maintenance cost in respect of 10 M.I projects during 2007-08.

While accepting, the Department stated (September 2009) that it will be implemented as soon as the Water Policy and Participatory Irrigation Management Act is passed by the Legislature.

1.2.12 Monitoring and evaluation

As per AIBP guidelines, there shall be a two tier monitoring system at State Level and Project Level. Monitoring Committee at the State Level is required to meet quarterly while Project Level Committees are required to meet every month and reports of meetings were to be submitted to the State Committee as well as to National Technical Committee. Reports of meetings held at State level were to be submitted to Technical Committee at the National level. The committee members were also required to visit sites of projects at least twice a year to monitor progress of the projects physically. However no such Committee was formed as of March 2009 either at State level or Project level. The monitoring system remained confined only to random inspection from C.E's office during progress of work.

AIBP guidelines further provide that the Central Water Commission (CWC) is required to monitor the MI projects periodically and assess the same against predetermined targets. Since inception (1999-2000) of M.I projects under AIBP, the CWC visited the State three times for monitoring during 2003, 2005 & 2007. Out of 1,133 M.I projects (AIBP) in eleven districts of Nagaland, the monitoring team inspected only 17 projects in two districts of Dimapur & Kohima indicating deficient monitoring of projects in the State both at the Central and State level.

1.2.13 Conclusion

The minor irrigation projects were implemented in the State without adequate planning leading to non-completion/abandonment of projects. Water charges were not collected from the users to meet the operation and maintenance cost of the projects. The records of the Department were also not reliable as projects stated to be completed were found to be incomplete/abandoned during physical verification of the sites. Hence, neither was impact assessment of the projects on agriculture undertaken by the Department nor could be ascertained in audit. Besides, there were several cases of fictitious, doubtful and unfruitful expenditure on the projects apart from inadequate monitoring of the implementation both at the State and Central Government levels. These issues indicate that irrigation projects in the State were not implemented efficiently.

1.2.14 Recommendations

- A reliable data base of irrigation projects in the State needs to be maintained;
- Proper survey and investigation may be conducted before selection of projects;
- Impact assessment of the projects on agricultural productivity need be assessed;
- Monitoring mechanism may be streamlined and physical verification conducted to evaluate the implementation of the projects.