

CHAPTER II

Performance Audit

Department of Home

2.1 Modernisation of Police Force

Executive Summary

The Government of India launched the Modernisation of Police Force (MPF) Scheme in order to supplement the efforts of the State Government to modernise the police force in order to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security. A performance audit of the implementation of the MPF scheme during the period 2012-13 to 2016-17 revealed the following:

There was delay of at least four months in submission of all Annual Action Plans (AAPs) by the Department to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). This not only delayed approval of AAPs by MHA but also led to delay in release and utilisation of funds.

(Paragraph 2.1.6.3)

The delay in release as well as utilisation of Central and State share of funds resulted in loss of central grants during 2013-14 and 2014-15 to the extent of ₹ 66.31 crore.

(Paragraph 2.1.7.1)

The Department incurred expenditure of ₹10.26 crore on office equipment, consultancy fees, annual maintenance fees, *etc.*, which were inadmissible under MPF scheme.

(Paragraph 2.1.7.3)

Out of 60 test-checked police stations, physical infrastructure like barracks, toilets, witness examination room and separate lockup facility for men and women were inadequate in 43, 34, 41 and 20 police stations respectively.

(Paragraph 2.1.8.2)

Though the Department procured arms under MPF scheme during 2012-13 to 2016-17, shortages *vis-à-vis* Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) scales were observed in respect of 5.56 mm INSAS, 0.303 Truncated Rifle, T.G. Gun 37/38 mm *etc.*

(Paragraph 2.1.9.1)

During 2012-13 to 2016-17, there was hardly any improvement in number of vehicles available under this scheme as the condemnation of old and obsolete vehicles exceeded the procurement of new vehicles.

(Paragraph 2.1.10.1)

The Department lagged in adopting modern technology for communication, as the communication sets available with the department were analog. Further, it could not procure modern digital communication equipment due to delay in obtaining Wireless Operating Licence.

(Paragraphs 2.1.11.1 and 2.1.11.2)

In three test-checked training institutes, trainees were deprived of training in various modern weapons due to non-functioning of fire arms simulator. Further, one training school was functioning without necessary obstacles required for outdoor training.

In addition, audit observed shortage of outdoor trainers when compared to prescribed BPR&D norms in two out of three test-checked training institutes.

(Paragraph 2.1.13)

The Special Police Forces viz., Coastal Police Stations, Special Weapons and Tactics Team, Anti-sabotage Check Wing and Anti Naxal Force are neither equipped nor trained to the optimal extent.

(Paragraph 2.1.14)

Objective of providing city police with extensive CCTV surveillance and upgraded Dial 100 Systems was delayed for more than two years due to delay in implementation of Megacity Policing.

(Paragraph 2.1.15)

2.1.1 Introduction

Government of India (GoI) launched Modernisation of Police Force (MPF) scheme in 1969 in order to supplement the efforts of State Government to modernise the police force to effectively face challenges to internal security.

The two major objectives of MPF scheme were to fulfill the identified deficiencies in various aspects of Police Administration and to reduce the dependence of State Governments on Central Armed Police Forces and Army. The scheme aimed to achieve the above objectives by strengthening police infrastructure by way of construction of secure police stations, equipping the police stations with required mobility, modern weaponry, communication equipment, forensic labs *etc.* Bengaluru city in Karnataka was selected as one of the seven cities across the nation under Megacity Policing, a sub-plan of MPF scheme introduced from 2005-06. The total outlay of MPF scheme for the State, its releases and expenditure during 2012-13 to 2016-17 are ₹595.56 crore, ₹445.75 crore and ₹347.68 crore respectively. The various plan and non-plan components of MPF scheme are indicated in the **Chart-2.1**.


Chart-2.1: Components of MPF scheme



2.1.2 Organisational Structure

The organogram of the Police Department⁵ is indicated in **Chart-2.2** below:

Chart-2.2: Organogram of the Police Department



The Additional Director General of Police (Communication, Logistics and Modernisation) is responsible for co-ordinating various activities connected with the implementation of MPF scheme in the department. A State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) headed by the Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka (GoK), was constituted to oversee implementation of MPF scheme.

⁵ ADGP (CL&M)-Additional Director General of Police (Communication, Logistic and Monitoring), ADGP (L&O)-Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order), DGP (ISD)-Director General of Police (Internal Security Division), DGP (CID)-Director General of Police (Criminal Investigation Department) PCW- Police Computer Wing, KSRP- Karnataka State Reserve Police, C&TS- Crime & Technical Services, CoP- Commissioner of Police, DIG- Deputy Inspector General of Police, IGP- Inspector General of Police, SP- Superintendent of Police, MTO-Motor Transport Organisation, DCP-Deputy Commissioner of Police, DSP- Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACP- Assistant Commissioner of Police, PI- Police Inspector, PSI- Police Sub-Inspector.

2.1.3 Audit Objectives

The performance audit was conducted to analyse whether:

- Planning was need based and the funds provided were utilised for the intended purpose;
- Equipment purchased/assets created were utilised optimally and the intended benefits were attained; and
- Implementation of the scheme was effectively monitored and impact of the scheme evaluated.

2.1.4 Audit Criteria

The audit findings were benchmarked against the following criteria:

- Norms prescribed by Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D);
- Scheme guidelines and instructions issued by GOI;
- Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurement Act (KTPP), 1999; and
- Karnataka Police Manual, 1988.

2.1.5 Scope and methodology of audit

The performance audit commenced with an Entry Conference held (February 2017) with the Additional Chief Secretary (ACS), Home Department, in which audit scope and methodology was explained. Review of the implementation of MPF scheme and other modernisation activities in police department was conducted during January 2017 to July 2017 covering the period 2012-17 through test-check of records of the offices of ACS (Home), DG&IGP, DGP (ISD), DGP (CID), ADGP (L&O), ADGP (CL&M), ADGP (C&TS), ADGP (KSRP), ADGP (Int.), ADGP (T&R) and Karnataka State Police Housing and Infrastructure Development Corporation (KSPHC), besides the records of three⁶ CoP and offices of Superintendents of Police (SP) in eight⁷ districts selected by adopting sampling method based on Probability Proportional to Size Without Replacement (PPSWOR). Sixty out of 247 police stations, which existed in the test-checked eight districts were selected based on Simple Random Sampling without Replacement⁸ (SRSWOR) (details in **Appendix-2.1**). Four Reserve Police Battalions, three Regional Forensic Science Laboratories (RFSL) and three Police Training Centres/Schools (PTC/PTS), which existed in the test-checked eight districts were also audited.

⁶ Belagavi, Bengaluru and Mysuru.

⁷ Ballari, Belagavi, Bengaluru, Kalaburagi, Mysuru, Shivamogga, Tumakuru and Udupi.

⁸ One fourth of the sub-divisions under each selected district were selected by Simple Random Sampling without Replacement (SRSWOR) method. In the selected sub-divisions, one fourth of the police circles (minimum two) were again selected by SRSWOR method. In the selected circles, one town police station and one rural police station are selected by SRSWOR method.

The methodology adopted by audit included scrutiny of files and documents, collection of data through analysis of documents, responses given by authorities to audit enquiries/questionnaires/proforma and joint inspection of police stations.

Audit Findings

As of January 2017, the actual police-population ratio of Karnataka was 145 per one lakh population against sanctioned police-population ratio of 183 per one lakh population, national average of 198 per one lakh population and United Nations norms of 222 per one lakh population. Representation of women in Karnataka police is at five *per cent* of working strength against a desired representation of up to 33 *per cent* as per Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) advisories issued from time to time.

During the Exit conference (November 2017), the Department agreed that shortages in manpower existed. It further stated that the current policy in the State was to raise the representation of women to 20 *per cent* and efforts were on to recruit more police officials especially women.

Since the representation of women in Karnataka is below the national average (seven *per cent*) as well as that of the neighbouring states (12 *per cent* in Tamilnadu, 11 *per cent* in Maharashtra and six *per cent* in Kerala), the Department needs to consider framing and implement an action plan for recruitment of women on top priority. Further, since the actual police-population ratio is far below the sanctioned police-population ratio, Government should fill the vacancies at the earliest.

Audit observations regarding MPF scheme are detailed in subsequent paragraphs:

2.1.6 Planning

Based on the strategic plan, the State Government was to prepare an Annual Action Plan (AAP) each year, which was to be approved by the GoI. AAP was to be prepared after taking inputs from various implementing units and submitted to MHA, GoI, after its approval by the SLEC.

2.1.6.1 Non-adherence to guidelines in preparation of strategic plan

GoI issued instructions (December 2010) to prepare strategic plan for the period 2011-2016. In response to the GoI instructions, a committee under ADGP (C&TS) prepared (June 2011) a strategic plan, which contained component-wise targets for five years. In the absence of analysis in terms of core elements, Audit could not ascertain the basis on which component wise targets were fixed. We also observed that though SLEC approved (June 2011) strategic plan was submitted to MHA (July 2011), no records were available to confirm if the plan was approved by the GoI.

Further, though the State Government instructed (July 2016) DG & IGP to prepare a strategic plan covering the period 2017-2020, action in this regard is yet to be initiated.

In the Exit Conference (November 2017), the Government agreed that preparation of strategic plan was essential for identifying the gaps and prioritising its needs. Further, Government replied (December 2017) that the strategic action plan for 2017-2020 would be prepared and submitted to the Government.

2.1.6.2 Preparation of Annual Action Plan (AAP)

The AAPs should include gap analysis and fix physical and financial targets, while translating the strategic plan into implementation steps. However, the AAPs of the State for the last five years *i.e.* during 2012-17, mentioned only the items to be procured and the cost associated with each item and did not include vital details such as availability, deficiency, priority, status of procurement, methods of procurement *etc.* We observed several deviations and prolonged delays in procurement of weapons and communication equipment (Paragraphs 2.1.9 and 2.1.11), which could be attributed to lack of adequate planning and prior assessment of requirement, availability, priority, mode of procurement, *etc.* Further, AAPs also did not match with the strategic plan prepared for 2011-16 as indicated in **Table-2.1** though some of the missing components in AAPs were actually implemented.

Table-2.1: Instances where AAP did not match with strategic plan

Component	As per Strategic plan	As per Annual Action Plans
Weaponry	Modern Weaponry such as Assault Rifle, Sub-Machine Gun, Pistols, Sniper Rifles, Glock Pistols <i>etc.</i>	Except Sub-Machine Gun and Pistols, other modern weaponry were not planned.
Mobility	Bullet proof vehicles, Rapid Intervention vehicles (RIV), Police Control Room (PCR) vans, Operational vehicles for Law and Order, buses for armed reserves and two wheelers.	Bullet proof vehicles, RIVs <i>etc.</i> , were not planned.
Communication	Digital wireless network for all districts and tetra radio trunking system for all major cities, command control system, Dial 100 system.	Except Dial 100 system for Hubballi, Mangaluru, Mysuru and Belagavi, the other components were not planned and implemented.
Megacity Policing	PCR vans, RIV vehicles, Mobile Command and Control vehicles, Live finger print scanners, CCTV, Call Detail Record (CDR) analysis software and e-beat system.	Mobile Command and Control vehicles, Live finger print scanners, CDR analysis software and e-beat system were not planned.
Equipment for police stations	Solar power packs, Biometric equipment for attendance, Digital display, CDR analysis investigation system.	The components mentioned in the strategic plan were not planned and implemented.
Training Infrastructure	Audio visual teaching aids, laboratories, models of practical training and simulators.	Except audio visual teaching aids, other components were not planned.

(Source: Information provided by ADGP (CL&M))

Government accepted (December 2017) the audit observation and stated that it was noted for future reference.

2.1.6.3 Delay in submission of AAP

The target date for submission of AAPs and approval of AAPs by MHA is January of previous financial year and April of the financial year to which the AAP pertains. However, we observed that all AAPs during 2012-13 to 2016-17 were submitted by the Department to MHA with a delay of at least four months as detailed in **Table-2.2**.

Table-2.2: Timeline of submission of AAP and approvals received

Year	Submission of AAP to MHA		
	Target Date	Actual Date	Delay(in days)
2012-13	15-01-2012	30-05-2012	136
2013-14	15-01-2013	21-05-2013	126
2014-15	15-01-2014	02-06-2014	138
2015-16	15-01-2015	23-05-2015	128
2016-17	15-01-2016	16-09-2016	245

(Source: Information furnished by ADGP (CL&M))

Delayed submission and consequent delay in approvals of AAPs delayed the release and utilisation of funds, which resulted in loss of central grants as discussed in paragraph 2.1.7.1.

The Government replied (December 2017) that guidelines for the scheme comes up only in the month of March every year and by the time, requirements of all units are consolidated and requisite approvals are obtained, a lot of time goes by. While assuring that such delays would be avoided in future, it stated that 2015-16 funds will be utilised by December 2017 and 2016-17 funds will be utilised by March 2018.

2.1.6.4 Deviation from approved AAP

As per the scheme guidelines, any modifications in the approved AAP are to be got approved by SLEC and then, MHA. Further, frequent and major modifications of AAP also indicated that AAPs proposed were not need-based and/or realistic. The instances of deviations from the approved AAP without approval of MHA are discussed below:

- AAP for the year 2013-14 was approved with an amount of ₹118.78 crore under plan head for construction of police stations, outposts, residential and non-residential buildings *etc.* Based on the approved AAP, GoI released (September 2013) an amount of ₹71.27 crore towards the central share. However, the sites for construction of police stations (10 out of 29 police stations) were not identified even though the central share was released. Location of three police stations had to be changed since a building was already existing in those areas. Location of another seven police stations was changed on account of non-availability of sites. This indicated that AAPs were prepared without properly assessing the requirements and/or ensuring the land availability, which was in contradiction to the Karnataka Public Works Department Code.

The Government replied (December 2017) that the deviations to AAPs were approved by SLEC (May 2014) on account of litigation and urgent need to construct police stations.

- Under megacity scheme, CoP Bengaluru planned (2013-2015) to procure the vehicles indicated in **Table-2.3** under mobility component:

Table-2.3: Vehicles planned under Megacity Policing

SI No	Name of the vehicle	Nos.	Cost per unit (in ₹ lakh)	Total Cost ₹ in lakh (Percentage to total)
1	PCR vans	52	6	312 (21)
2	Bomb disposal team vehicle	4	25	100 (7)
3	Mini bus to accompany very important persons (VIP) cars	2	30	60 (4)
4	Un Manned Aerial vehicle (UAV)	1	50	50 (3)
5	Bullet proof vehicle for VIP security	2	60	120 (8)
6	Canine Vans	6	15	90 (6)
7	Highway Patrol cars	7	50	350 (24)
8	RIV	24	16	384 (26)

(Source: Information furnished by the Department)

Against plan to procure eight category of vehicles for varied uses at a cost of ₹14.66 crore, the entire allocated fund was diverted (February 2016) towards procurement of 140 Toyota Innova as PCR vans. Since the DGS&D⁹ Rate Contract (RC) for Toyota Innova expired, the department then evaluated the four-wheelers available under DGS&D RC and recommended (February 2016) the purchase of 222 Maruti Suzuki “Ertiga”.

Non-procurement of one UAV despite inclusion in plan would deprive the City police of peculiar advantages of UAV as it acts as a force-multiplier through remotely controlled aerial surveillance.

Diversion of funds allocated for 24 RIVs would mean that the City police is currently inadequately equipped with only five RIVs, which play a major role in riot control and other law & order situations.

Similarly, plans of Bengaluru city police to establish a Bomb disposal squad of its own are still at infancy and even the Bomb disposal team vehicle is yet to be procured.

The Government replied (December 2017) that:

- It was planned to upgrade the existing Dial 100 system to substantially reduce the response time after receiving a distress call and to achieve the same, more number of vehicles suitable for Dial 100 and patrolling were required.
- Utilisation of UAV funds for purchase of patrolling vehicles under Dial 100 system helped the city police to improve its ‘Mobility’ which is one of the component of MPF scheme.
- During exit conference (November 2017), the Department stated that UAVs were not procured due to absence of any policy in this regard.

⁹ Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals.

- The funds for RIVs were utilised for patrolling vehicles as in case of an emergency, patrolling vehicles can be deployed to partly function as RIV by loading required material.
- The proposal (October 2014) for formation of new Bomb Detection and Disposal Team for Bengaluru city was approved by the State Government during March 2017 and hence, funds allocated out of State budget would be utilised by end of 2017-18.

The Department, however, utilised the funds for Mobility component only. Significant deviations during implementation reflects inadequate planning as the exact utility and requirement of all categories of vehicles was known even while preparing the detailed project report for megacity scheme. Further, if the lack of policy for UAV was the reason for non-procurement, UAV should not have been included in the plan.

- An amount of ₹4.35 crore allocated for training infrastructure was diverted (June 2013) to mobility stating that no further expenditure is required on training infrastructure. This was done without the approval of both SLEC as well as High Power Committee. Moreover, out of these funds, 10 Maruti Swift Dzire cars were purchased at a cost of ₹62.74 lakh and allotted to Chief offices¹⁰. Thus, an amount of ₹62.74 lakh was incurred on inadmissible items as the MPF scheme allows expenditure only on operational vehicles under Mobility component.

The Government replied (December 2017) that ratification of the said diversion would be taken up in the coming SLEC.

Recommendation-1: The State Government should prepare annual action plans with proper gap analysis and after considering all details such as requirement, availability, deficiency, status of procurement, priority etc., in order to avoid modification during implementation.

2.1.7 Financial Management

Under the MPF scheme, the Centre and the State Government were to share expenditure in the ratio of 60:40 from 2012-13 onwards. GoI released its central share to GoK except the share for weaponry component, which was directly released to Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) for supply of arms and ammunition to the State. The State Government in turn releases the Central share received along with its share to the department. Audit observations in this regard are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

2.1.7.1 Short release, delay in release of funds and loss of grants

On the basis of AAPs, the allocation of funds, the actual release by the Centre as well as State Government under MPF scheme and the corresponding expenditure for the years 2012-13 to 2016-17 is indicated in **Table-2.4**.

¹⁰ AIGP-General, AIGP-Crime, SP-Finger Print Bureau etc.

Table-2.4: Short release, delay in release and loss of grants during 2012-13 to 2016-17

(in ₹ crore)

Year	Allocation as per AAP		Unspent balance at the beginning of the year	Central share released to		Release by State Government to the department			Total available funds with the department	Expenditure (Percent of available funds)	Unspent balance at the end of the year
	Centre	State		GoK	OFB	Central share	State share	Total			
2012-13	19.49	12.99	54.72	17.35	2.14	Nil	Nil	Nil	54.72	24.53 (45)	30.19
2013-14	38.86 71.27 (P)	25.91 47.51 (P)	30.19 Nil	Nil 71.21 (P)	6.23 --	17.35 34.00 (P)	12.99 --	30.34 (2012-13) 34.00 (P)	60.53 34.00 (P)	40.75 (67) 12.36 (36)	19.78 21.64 (P)
2014-15	35.56 48.30 (Megacity) 58.47 (P)	23.71 32.19 (Megacity) 38.98 (P)	19.78 21.64 (P)	Nil 40.73 (Megacity) 58.47 (P)	5.13 Nil	Nil Nil 37.27 (P)	Nil Nil 47.51 (P)	Nil Nil (Megacity) 84.78 (P)	19.78 106.42 (P)	9.22 (47) 66.63 (63)	10.56 39.79 (P)
2015-16	42.70	28.46	10.56 39.79 (P)	34.66 Nil	4.79 Nil	34.66 <u>18.50</u> 53.16	6.75 <u>Nil</u> <u>6.75</u>	41.41 <u>18.50</u> (Megacity) 59.91	70.47 137.24 (P)	41.80 (59) 56.71 (41)	28.67 80.53 (P)
2016-17	42.70	28.46	28.67 80.53 (P)	37.91 <u>7.57</u> 45.48 Nil	4.79 Nil	Nil 22.23 Nil	16.35 <u>32.19</u> <u>48.54</u> Nil	16.35 (2015-16) <u>54.42</u> (Megacity) 70.77 Nil	99.44 80.53 (P)	38.67 (39) 57.01 (71)	60.77 23.51 (P)
Total	357.35	238.21		267.90	23.08	222.48	154.77	377.25		347.68	

(Source: Information furnished by ADGP (CL&M))

During 2012-13 to 2016-17, GoI and GoK released ₹290.98 crore (81 per cent) and ₹154.77 crore (65 per cent) against total allocation of ₹357.35 crore and ₹238.21 crore respectively.

In the revised scheme guidelines, it was specified that from the financial year 2013-14, complete liquidation on unspent balances was made mandatory and unless UCs were available for full amounts of funds released earlier, no further releases were to be made to the State Governments.

The release of non-Plan grants and its utilisation indicated in the **Table-2.4** is discussed below:

- During 2012-13, GoI released its share of ₹19.49 crore to GoK (₹17.35 crore) and OFB (₹2.14 crore). However, GoK did not further release this amount along with its own share to Department. Also, out of the ₹54.72 crore lying with Department from previous years' funds, it could utilise only ₹24.53 crore leaving ₹30.19 crore unutilised.
- During 2013-14 and 2014-15, due to un-utilised funds lying with department, the GoI did not release its allocated share to GoK and released ₹6.23 crore and ₹5.13 crore to OFB during 2013-14 and 2014-15 respectively. This resulted in a loss of central assistance to the tune of ₹32.63 crore and ₹30.43 crore during 2013-14 and 2014-15 respectively. Further, the State Government did not release its matching share of ₹7.57¹¹ crore for the grants released by GoI to OFB directly.

¹¹ ₹4.15 crore and ₹3.42 crore for 2013-14 and 2014-15 respectively.

- During 2014-15, against central allocation of ₹48.30 crore for Megacity Policing, GoI released an amount of ₹40.73 crore only. GoK, further released the central share to the Department in the 2015-16 and its own matching share in 2016-17.
- During 2015-16, GoI released ₹39.45 crore against an allocation of ₹42.70 crore. Though GoK released entire central share received to the Department, its own share was short released by ₹19.55 crore. Out of ₹19.55 crore, ₹16.35 crore was released by GoK in 2016-17.
- During 2016-17, GoI released the entire allocated amount (₹42.70 crore) to GoK (₹37.91 crore) and OFB (₹4.79 crore). However, the amount was in-turn not further released by GoK to Department.

Thus, the delayed releases and also delay in utilisation of central and its own share resulted in loss of central grants amounting to ₹66.31 crore¹², which could otherwise have been utilised for the modernisation activities of the State police force. Since no funds were released during 2013-14 and 2014-15, the department could not carry out their activities planned for the said two years. In addition, the department also lost their State share of grants of ₹44.20 crore *i.e.* 40 *per cent* share of the Central grants lost.

The Government accepted (December 2017) the observation and stated that delays would be avoided in future.

2.1.7.2 Submission of incorrect Utilisation Certificates

The MPF scheme guidelines specified preparation of Utilisation Certificates (UCs) strictly on the basis of the Receipts and Payments account. It also specified that UCs should indicate the advances lying with the peripheral units separately.

However, we observed that even though ₹35.17 crore deposited with KSPHC remained un-utilised (**Table-2.5**), UCs furnished by the department (May 2017) for the year 2015-16 indicated utilisation as 100 *per cent* for the years 2000-01 to 2014-15 without showing the advances lying with the peripheral units.

Table-2.5: Non-plan funds deposited with KSPHC remaining unutilised

(₹in crore)

Sl. No.	Year of Action Plan	Un-utilised Grant Amount	Date of deposit	Purpose for which allocated
1	2006-07 & 2008-09	10.00	05.04.2010	Procurement of Automated Finger print Identification System for Finger Print Bureau
2	2006-07 & 2008-09	7.70	07.01.2009 & 31.03.2009	Procurement of Solar Power Packs for CCTNS
3	2008-09	1.80	21.04.2010	Digital wireless
4	2009-10	0.33	28.03.2012	Wireless Equipment
5	2010-11 & 2012-13	7.33	10.04.2014	Digital wireless walkie talkie
6	2011-12 & 2012-13	8.01	14.10.2014	CCTV to ANF/Coastal police stations
	Total	35.17		

(Source: Information furnished by KSPHC)

¹² ₹32.63 crore (2013-14), ₹30.43 crore (2014-15) and ₹3.25 crore (2015-16).

Thus, UC submitted to GoI were incorrect and inflated.

The Government replied (December 2017) that unspent balances was indicated in UCs submitted to the GoI during June 2016. However, the reply is silent with respect to UCs submitted during May 2017.

2.1.7.3 Utilisation of MPF scheme fund towards inadmissible items

The MPF scheme guidelines enlisted items which were inadmissible under the scheme. As per this list, office equipment *viz.*, fax machines, photocopier *etc.*, furniture items *viz.*, chairs, computer tables, *etc.*, vehicles such as cars, training fees, consultancy fees, expenditure on annual maintenance contract *etc.*, were inadmissible. However, we observed that inadmissible items worth ₹10.26 crore were procured. Out of this, ₹7.54 crore was incurred on providing basic facilities such as furniture, water filters, fans, chairs, separate toilets for men/women, wheel chairs for physically challenged, telephone, stationary items, computers, printers, tables and separate vehicle parking shed *etc.*, to the general public visiting police stations, which did not form part of the AAP of the said year.

In the Exit Conference (November 2017), the Department stated that the MHA was requested to permit the State to procure the said items under the state share of MPF scheme. Further, Government replied (December 2017) that the items procured were essential to run the office. It also stated that such deviations would not occur in the future.

MPF funds meant for training centres were, however, utilised towards inadmissible items even though the training centres were deprived of training infrastructure such as obstacles, simulators *etc.*, as discussed in Para 2.1.13.1 and 2.1.13.2.

2.1.7.4 Payment of Establishment, Tools and Plant charges to KSPHC for procurements carried out by the department

The State Government permitted (May 2008) KSPHC to levy Establishment, Tools and Plant (ETP) charges as decided by its Board of Directors for the works executed by them. The approved maximum ETP charges for the works pertaining to the Police Department were 10 *per cent* and five *per cent* for construction and procurement respectively. Further, the department also deposited un-utilised funds with KSPHC in order to avoid lapse of grants along with funds transferred for execution of works entrusted to it. We observed that KSPHC levied ETP charges amounting to ₹0.72 crore (**Table-2.6**) on procurements carried out by the department itself while the payments were made out of the funds deposited with KSPHC. This amount needs to be recovered from KSPHC.

Table-2.6: ETP charges levied on the procurements carried out by the department

(₹ in crore)			
Sl. No.	Procurement details	Procurement amount	ETP charges
1.	Implementation of video surveillance system in Bengaluru city	11.43	0.49
2.	Dial 100	3.79	0.20
3.	Wireless sets	0.75	0.03
	Total	15.97	0.72

(Source: Information furnished by KSPHC)

In the Exit Conference (November 2017) as well as in the Government reply (December 2017), it was stated that action was initiated to recover ETP charges at the instance of audit.

Recommendation-2: The State Government should ensure that the scheme funds are spent only on the admissible items and the UCs furnished should correctly reflect the amount lying unspent with the State Government or its implementing agencies.

Implementation of MPF scheme

The AAPs approved by MHA for the years 2012-13 to 2016-17 provided for implementation of following components of MPF scheme.


2.1.8 Infrastructure development

Construction of police stations and outposts as well as residential accommodation was one of the objectives of MPF scheme. During 2013-14 and 2014-15, an amount of ₹216.23 crore was allotted under MPF scheme for construction/upgradation of police stations, outposts and non-residential buildings. Out of the above funds, 115 works were undertaken at an estimated cost of ₹212.90 crore. As of March 2017, 109 works were completed at a cost of ₹192.71 crore and six works were ongoing.

2.1.8.1 Infrastructural deficiencies in test-checked police stations

The police station is the primary point of interaction between the citizens and police and is a key functional unit from where the police discharges its task of maintenance of law and order, investigation of cases *etc.* BPR&D revised (2015) the standards for construction of police stations incorporating features such as basic facilities for women cops, provision of community policing space, adequate barrack space *etc.* The infrastructure provided in the 60 test-checked police stations are indicated in **Chart-2.3**.

Chart-2.3: Infrastructure provided in 60 test-checked Police Stations



Out of the 60 test-checked police stations, we observed that:


- Forty one and 43 police stations did not have a separate room for witness examination and barrack facility respectively.
- There were deficiencies as regards toilet facilities as 34, 31 and 32 police stations did not have separate toilet for men and women visitors, separate room with toilet for lady officials and lockups with internal toilet respectively.

Other observations relating to infrastructural deficiencies in the 60 test-checked police stations are discussed below:

- In Doddapette police station in Shivamogga city, Ladies lockup room was used to store arms, documents and other articles and in Devaraja police station in Mysuru city, the arms were kept in the open without lock-in facility.



- The only lockup room of Grameena police station, Kalaburagi was used as computer room. Further, a single room was used as barrack without cots, toilets and other facilities.



- The Kota police station in Udupi district was functioning in an old building. Due to space constraints, old records were dumped inside the station itself. Service weapons were kept along with seized weapons. The room had no window shutters and the documents and weapons were exposed to rain and moisture.



The Government replied (December 2017) that arms of the police station of Shivamogga city and Devaraja police station of Mysuru city were shifted to the store room. It was stated that a separate lockup room, an additional barrack and toilet were arranged for the use of staff in Grameena police station, Kalaburagi. Further, it was stated that during the current year, construction of a new police station was taken up in Kota, Udupi district.

Recommendation-3: Infrastructural facilities for police stations such as strong room for arms, barrack facilities, separate toilet facilities, etc., need to be augmented.

2.1.9 Weaponry

Modern weapons are the backbone of an effective police force, without which it cannot perform effectively and maintain law and order. BPR&D devised (January 2001) scale of weapons with which, the police forces in the State are to be equipped. While GoI releases its share under weaponry component directly to OFB for supply to the State, GoK can adopt any method for procuring equipment out of its share. The status of GoK share of funds towards weaponry is indicated in **Table-2.7**.

Table-2.7: State share funds released under weaponry component of MPF

Year	Funds (₹ in crore)	Remarks
2012-13	6.29	Items received
2013-14	Nil	No allocation made
2014-15	1.19	Not released
2015-16	1.19	Released to Department but unspent
2016-17	3.19	Not released

(Source: Information furnished by the Department)

2.1.9.1 Shortage of weapons in the State

On comparison of various types of arms available with the department with the scales as prescribed by BPR&D, shortages were observed in the arms as detailed in **Table-2.8**.

Table-2.8: Shortages of arms in comparison with scales prescribed by BPR&D (as of March 2017)

Sl. No.	Types of ARMS	Minimum requirement as per BPR&D ¹³ scale	Available with department		Shortage	Percentage of shortage
			As of March 2012	As of March 2017		
1	AK 47 /5.56 Ex-Callibur	3,288	976	2,088	1,200	37
2	5.56 mm INSAS	4,109	579	1,243	2,866	70
3	12 Bore Pump Action Gun	4,896	2,912	3,581	1,315	27
4	Auto Pistol 9 mm	15,755	10,482	11,584	4,171	26
5	T.G. Gun 37/38 mm	2,682	1,565	1,839	843	31
6	0.303 Truncated Rifle	1,835	522	522	1,313	72

(Source: Information furnished by DG&IGP)

From the table, though it is noticed that there was procurement during the period 2012-13 to 2016-17, it was not to the extent required and shortages existed *vis-à-vis* the minimum requirement prescribed by BPR&D. Further, it was noticed that there was maximum shortage of 0.303 Truncated Rifle, which was essential in each police station. Thus, the objective of MPF Scheme of equipping the Police with modern weapons for bringing improvement in preparedness and striking capability of police force was not fully achieved.

Specific instances of delays in completion of procurement process are detailed below:

- As per approved action plan of 2010-11, an amount of ₹7.30 crore was allocated for purchase of weapons (400 Assault Rifles, 300 Colt –M4 and 300 Laser Sight Device for M4, 700 Auto Pistol 9mm, 20 Corner Shot Vision Sight and 500 Jump Grenades). GoK proposed (August 2011) to MHA to procure and supply the said weapons. But after non-receipt of communication from MHA in this regard, the Department sought permission (June 2014) from MHA to purchase 509 Assault Rifles, 50 Colt-M4 and 160 MP5 through State Trading Corporation (STC) by

¹³ BPR&D prescribes scale of weapons for each units *viz.*, Police Stations, District Armed Police, Armed Police Battalion, CID Special Branch, Training *etc.* Further, the type and number of arms are prescribed based on type of police stations/category of police stations *etc.*

getting 4(g) exemption under KTPP Act. MHA clarified (October 2014) that it had no role to play in purchases through STC and it can be done as per State Government rules. While the Department was waiting for State Government's decision on 4(g) exemption to STC, MHA asked (August 2014) States to revise/re-confirm their demand for Assault Rifles. At this stage, the State Government diverted entire funds of ₹7.30 crore for purchase of 3,255 AK-47 Assault Rifles and made payment (October 2015) to CRPF for its supply. CRPF is yet to supply the weapons to the department. Hence, against the intended procurement of only 400 Assault Rifles in AAP of 2010-11, the department utilised entire amount allocated towards purchase of various categories of weapons for procurement of 3,255 Assault Rifles (AK 47), which was far above the requirement of 1,200.

Thus, delay in finalising the mode of procurement and diverting entire funds for Assault Rifles resulted in the non-availability of weapons of other categories and their accessories, especially Laser Sight Device, Corner Short Vision Sight and Jump Grenades. These accessories would help in improving the effectiveness of the police force in hostile situations usually involving terrorists and hostage situations and allow the operator to see and attack an armed target without exposing the operator to counterattack.

The Government replied (December 2017) that despite repeated correspondence with MHA, no information was received. It further added that since these were imported items, MHA did not take any action to procure and supply. It also mentioned that CRPF had stated that acceptance of tender for purchase of AK-47 rifles was awaiting MHA approval.

- Multiple Grenade Launcher for door/obstacle breaching during specialised operations and Sub-Machine Gun MP-5 with silencer were required by the ISD for augmenting its operational capability for counter terrorism. Hence, as per the approved action plan of 2014-15, an amount of ₹1.19 crore was allocated from State share for procurement of weaponry such as Sub Machine Gun MP-5 SD3 with silencer, Medium Grenade Launcher 40mm and Sports Purpose Automatic Shotgun for ISD. However, the amount was not released by the State Government and thus, was once again allocated in AAP 2015-16 for the same purpose. Though the propriety article certificate was obtained from DGP (ISD) for procurement of the arms through STC, further action was not initiated depriving ISD of cutting edge technology.

The Government agreed (December 2017) that procurement of these weapons was initiated based on specific requirements of ISD. It further replied that since the Department had not done any global tendering so far, which was required for such propriety items, it was proposed to procure these weapons through STC. It added that the funds were revalidated for the year 2017-18 and action would be taken to procure these weapons after obtaining 4(g) exemption for procurement through STC.

- The percentage of shortage with respect to non-lethal weapons *i.e.*, 0.303 Truncated Rifles, Tear Gas Gun 37/38 mm and 12 Bore Pump Action Gun was 72, 31 and 27 respectively.

The Government replied (December 2017) that 0.303 truncated rifles were not easily available with any agency under the GoI and hence, it was not able to procure the 0.303 Truncated Rifles.

Thus, due to continued shortages and prolonged delays in purchase of weapons, the objective of the MPF scheme of equipping the Police with modern weapons for bringing improvement in preparedness and striking capability of police force was not achieved.

2.1.9.2 Non-availability of ammunition

Audit reviewed the availability of ammunition in all the police units across the State as on quarter ending March 2017 with respect to the arms supplied to various police units. It was observed that out of 18 police units as detailed in **Appendix-2.2**, arms were held in stock without appropriate ammunition in 16 police units. Similarly, ammunition were held in stock without appropriate arms to use them in two units. Hence, there was a need to synchronise the supply of arms and ammunition by the department in order to avoid the idling of weapons/ammunition.

Further, in Headquarters of City Armed Reserve (CAR), Bengaluru and District Armed Reserve (DAR), Mysuru, the old ammunition, which were certified (December 2016) by the competent authority as expired and unsafe to be used, were held in stock. In CAR Headquarters, Bengaluru, the entire stock of 0.38 ball/blank ammunition and 0.410 ball/blank ammunition had expired and the unit was left with no ammunition to operate the arms appropriate with the ammunition. Similarly, in DAR Mysuru, as per the certificate furnished by the competent authority (March 2017), entire stock of 0.410 ball and 0.38 blank ammunition and more than 90 *per cent* of the stock of 0.450 ball, 0.455 ball and 0.303 blank ammunition had expired. As discussed in paragraph 2.1.13.5, there were shortages in annual firing practice. By conducting the training regularly, the expiry of ammunition could be minimised. In addition, these expired ammunition must be condemned and replaced at the earliest as they are not only unfit for usage during emergency but are also unsafe for the operator.

In reply (December 2017), the Government stated that it had sought (June 2017) guidelines/procedure to dispose the expired ammunition from the CRPF.

2.1.9.3 Maintenance of arms and ammunition in test-checked police units

Maintenance of arms and ammunition is important as usage of the weapons during exigencies was vital and they should function as predicted. Non-maintenance of weapons would render their usage uncertain and the expenditure thereof wasteful.

Audit scrutiny of maintenance of arms and ammunitions in the test-checked police units revealed that in 21 out of 60 test-checked police stations in eight districts and three CoPs, apart from Police Inspectors and Police Sub-Inspectors, 9 mm pistols were allotted to Assistant Sub-Inspectors (ASIs) and Head Constables (HCs) and issued to the police stations. In turn, though the above pistols were issued to ASIs and HCs, they were kept in safe custody in the police station itself. As a result, responsibility of periodical cleaning was not fixed. In the absence of regular maintenance of the weapons, the utility of the same during exigencies could not be ensured. In addition, the weapons kept in police stations had the risk of being misused.

Though the Government, in its reply (December 2017) quoted all the provisions/standing orders that exists for cleaning and maintenance of arms both in Headquarters as well as police stations, it did not comment on the lapses pointed out by audit.

Recommendation-4: The State Government should make good the shortages of arms and expedite the purchase of weapons required for specialised operations to adequately equip the police force.

Recommendation-5: Proper mechanism to keep track of expiry of ammunition should be evolved to avoid stocking of obsolete ammunition.

2.1.10 Mobility

Mobility plays an important role in saving lives and maintaining law and order by quick deployment of personnel and is thus, an important determinant of police performance.

2.1.10.1 Non-achievement of enhancement of quantum of police vehicles

The State Government issued (December 2013) orders for condemnation of vehicles, which had run more than two lakh kilometers and were more than seven years old. We observed that in test-checked police units, out of 1,665 four wheelers, 592 (36 *per cent*) were eligible for condemnation (Details in **Appendix-2.3**). Further, we observed that out of the above 592 vehicles, maintenance expenditure exceeded the actual cost in respect of 60 vehicles. The continued operation of the above vehicles significantly increased the maintenance expenditure. Further, the obsolescence of vehicles was likely to have an adverse impact on effectiveness of police force.

Though the department purchased total of 1,252 four wheelers during 2012-17, fleet volume decreased as 1,334 vehicles were condemned during the same period. Thus, the department needs to ensure that the requirement should consider the shortages likely to arise due to condemnation of obsolete vehicles.

The Government agreed (December 2017) that since condemnation of all vehicles older than seven years in one go is not possible, condemnation in stages in sync with replacement was taken up.

2.1.10.2 Non-functioning of AVLS systems

The department procured (2010-12) 2,864 GPS-based Advanced Vehicle Location System (AVLS) at a cost of ₹3.73 crore with the intention of tracking and monitoring the location of the police vehicles and enabling the control rooms to instruct patrolling vehicles to reach the place of distress call quickly.

The agreement mandated the supplier to maintain the devices till the end of the warranty period and the department to pay recurring charges for software maintenance, data centre and web server maintenance, device SIM card charges, map updates *etc.* A penalty of ₹200 per day per unit was to be levied for the non-responsiveness of the firm.

We observed that the department evaluated that only 61 *per cent* of the devices were working at a given point of time and worked out the penalty to ₹18.72 crore for the period 2010-11 to 2015-16. However, the department did not take any action to recover the penalty, though it possessed a Bank guarantee (10 *per cent* of the contract value) submitted by the firm.

On a review of the functioning of the above devices in eight test-checked districts and two CoPs (details in **Appendix-2.4**), it was observed that out of 730 devices installed, all the 349 devices installed in five¹⁴ test-checked units were not functioning.

The Government replied (December 2017) that modules are dependent on various factors such as vehicle location, network, battery condition of vehicle, devices removed from/not properly connect to vehicle, improper operation by drivers *etc.*

Though network and coverage issues are genuine constraints, which are not in the control of the department, the Department is responsible for non-working of devices due to poor battery condition of vehicles and failure of drivers to operate them properly.

2.1.10.3 Non-utilisation of Command Control Vehicle of State Intelligence Department

The department procured (March 2010) a Command and Control Vehicle¹⁵ for ₹65.01 lakh under MPF scheme after following all tender procedures to enhance police surveillance for events involving huge gatherings, which are sensitive in nature, and allotted it to the police intelligence wing. As per the agreement, after the satisfactory delivery of the vehicle and on the expiry of the agreed warranty period, the vendor had to offer the department an Annual Maintenance Contract (AMC) for maintenance on mutually agreed terms and conditions.

¹⁴ SP-Belagavi, SP-Kalaburagi, SP-Mysuru, CoP-Belagavi and CoP-Mysuru.

¹⁵ Customised air conditioned vehicle with independent power source, wired and wireless IP video surveillance equipment, facility to integrate with police wireless equipment and GPS tracker and computer systems to monitor surveillance feed.

After the expiry of warranty in January 2012, the department did not make efforts to enter into an AMC and continued to utilise the vehicle. However, from February 2013, the vehicle could not be put to use for want of maintenance, logistics and performance issues. Thus, the lack of proactive action by the department to provide proper annual maintenance for such a high-end vehicle with sophisticated equipment resulted in non-utilisation of the vehicle during huge gatherings such as Mysuru Dasara, cricket matches *etc.*

The Government replied (December 2017) that a proposal (July 2017) for upgradation of the vehicle and allotting it to Police Commissionerate/Police Range has been made for its better utility.

Recommendation-6: The Department should ensure the regular maintenance of modern technology such as AVLS, Command Control Vehicle *etc.*, to optimally utilise them and prevent deterioration for want of maintenance.

2.1.11 Communication

Modern means of communication are the backbone of effective policing. At present, Very High Frequency (VHF) communication networks are deployed in all the districts and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) communication networks in the major cities of the state.

2.1.11.1 Obsolete communication sets

There were 43,636 communication sets available as of March 2017. Out of this, there were 13,950 analog static/vehicle mobiles and 29,446 analog walkie talkies and 240 digital walkie talkies. From the records, we observed that the sets were last procured during 2009-10 and all the sets available with the department had completed their maximum life span since the life span of wireless sets and walkie talkie was eight and six years respectively.

Further, in the eight SP offices, two Commissionerate offices and four Karnataka State Reserve Police (KSRP) battalions test-checked, we observed that out of 5,333 static/vehicle mobile and 12,990 walkie talkies installed, 3,829 static/vehicle mobiles and 9,832 walkie talkies were functioning. Further, we observed that in eight and nine SP offices/Commissionerate offices/KSRP battalions, the percentage of working static/vehicle mobiles and walkie-talkie respectively was less than 70 as detailed in **Appendix-2.5**.

In Agumbe police station, out of 14 walkie talkies issued, only four were in working condition. While two walkie talkies were issued to PSI and for sentry duty, remaining two walkie talkies were utilised for normal duty. Further, we observed that 11 police personnel assigned as Anti Naxal Force (ANF) had to perform routine combing operation without any walkie talkies. Lack of communication equipment hampered the operational ability of police force and may prove fatal during operations as reinforcements would not be available in the absence of communication links with headquarters.

In the Exit Conference (November 2017), the Government stated that wireless network connectivity issues persisted due to geographical peculiarity of the Western Ghats. Further, the Government replied (December 2017) that action is being taken to procure good digital technology sets.

Delay in procurement of digital communication equipment is discussed in the subsequent paragraph.

2.1.11.2 Delay in adoption of modern technology

The communication systems of the department as discussed in the previous paragraph were analog systems. Since it is an unsecured open channel without encryption, which could compromise the confidentiality of information/messages, the department in its strategic plan for 2011-12 to 2015-16 proposed Digital Wireless Network for all the districts and all small cities and major cities in the State in a phased manner. In this regard, we observed the following:

- Though AAPs for the years 2013-14 to 2016-17 projected allocation of ₹15.93 crore towards procurement of communication equipment, only ₹6.23 crore was released which was yet to be utilised.
- The department deposited ₹10.25 crore pertaining to the action plan years 2008-09 to 2012-13 with KSPHC, which did not have the mandate for purchase of equipment. Out of the said deposited amount, ₹0.75 crore was incurred during March 2012 towards procurement of 240 digital wireless equipment and the balance ₹9.50 crore remained unutilised for reasons such as non-finalisation of tenders and non-availability of DGS&D rate contracts in respect of telecommunication equipment. Further, the digital wireless equipment procured could not be utilised for the intended purpose due to delay in applying (March 2016) for Wireless Operating License (WOL) from the Ministry of Communication, which is yet to be obtained.
- The department after following all due tender procedures for supply, installation and maintenance of digital Very High Frequency (VHF) wireless equipment for Bengaluru, Mysuru and Belagavi cities issued (January 2016) supply order to M/s.Rolta India Limited for supply of 252 digital VHF static sets, 640 digital VHF handheld sets and 225 digital mobile sets at a cost of ₹4.46 crore. As per the supply order, the delivery and commissioning of the equipment was to be made within 150 days after issue of operating license by the user department. However, the department approached the Ministry of Communication for issue of WOL for digital networks only during March 2016 after issue of supply order even though it was aware that WOL was absolutely necessary while procuring wireless equipment as communicated by the Ministry of Communication. In the absence of WOL, the department could not procure the equipment even though supply order was issued.

The Government replied (December 2017) that due to poor response and delay in supply of digital wireless equipment by M/s.Rolta India Ltd., the earlier supply order was cancelled and new tenders were floated for procurement of the same.

The reply is not acceptable. Despite being aware of requirement of WOL for procurement of digital wireless equipment since October 2013, the department approached GoI for WOL only during March 2016. The WOL is necessary for procurement of the devices and re-tendering will not yield any result until WOL is obtained.

Thus, even after allocating ₹10.25 crore towards digitisation of wireless equipment, the department continued to utilise old and obsolete analog wireless equipment.

2.1.11.3 Avoidable liability of expenditure towards spectrum charges

Ministry of Communication issued (April 2004) a Memorandum regarding levy of spectrum charges on wireless sets being used for communication purposes. As per the Memorandum, all Government Ministries/Departments/Organisations were to pay annual spectrum charges. In the case of failure to pay spectrum charges within scheduled date, late fee at the rate of two *per cent* per month compounded annually was to be paid.

On scrutiny of records, we observed that though the department paid spectrum charges upto March 2017, late fee amounting to ₹27.83 crore charged from 2004 onwards (January 2017) was yet to be paid. Even though the department approached the Ministry of Communication for waiver of the late fee, it clarified (January 2015) that there was no provision to waive the late fee imposed after 2004. Thus, delay in payment of spectrum charges by the department resulted in avoidable liability of late fee of ₹27.83 crore.

The Government replied (December 2017) that spectrum charges were paid for the period upto March 2017 but was silent about the clarification regarding non-provision for waiver of the late fee.

Recommendation-7: The State Government should expedite the procurement of modern communication equipment to replace/supplement existing obsolete equipment. Requisite licenses to operate the communication equipment should also be obtained in a timely manner to utilise the equipment.

2.1.12 Forensic Science Laboratory

Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) provides technical and scientific assistance to the Police department by analysing samples received/collected from the crime scenes. Karnataka police has five Regional Forensic Science Laboratories (RFSL) located at Mysuru, Mangaluru, Davanagere, Kalaburagi, and Belagavi apart from Directorate of Forensic Science Laboratory, Bengaluru (DFSL). While RFSLs have three sections *viz.*, Biology (Stains & Serology), Toxicology and Photography, DFSL deals with Chemistry, Physics, Fire arms, Questioned Documents and DNA, Forensic Psychology and Cyber Forensics.

2.1.12.1 Working of FSL

The FSLs received 21,052 cases¹⁶ with 1,08,671 exhibits under various branches during the year 2016. Audit analysed the pendency of cases and observed that at the end of May 2017, 3,946 cases were pending and out of this 1,052 cases pertained to the year 2016. Out of these, 334 cases were pending for more than a year with 39 and 99 of them pending for more than two and three years respectively. The major reasons for pendency in the FSLs are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

2.1.12.2 Shortage in technical manpower

Cadre & Recruitment (C&R) rules for FSL staff, which were framed in 2001 sanctioned 148 technical and 135 ministerial posts. In July 2015, additional 284 technical and 25 ministerial posts were sanctioned, for which, C&R rules were approved only during August 2017. Recruitment against these posts is yet to be initiated. As of 31 March 2017, FSLs were working with 60 *per cent* of sanctioned strength in the technical cadre.

It was observed that all 99 cases pending for more than two years pertained to DNA section, which operates with the staff of Biology section of DFSL instead of separate technical staff.

The Government agreed (December 2017) that due to shortage of staff and substantial increase of inflow of cases, more cases were pending in DNA section. It further stated that action was initiated to fill up the vacant post in DNA centre. The Government needs to recruit qualified people against these posts and deploy the existing staff back to their parent sections.

2.1.12.3 Deployment of technical staff without requisite qualification in FSL

We observed that technical staff working in various sections of FSLs did not possess qualification/expertise required for the respective sections as detailed in **Table-2.9** below.

Table-2.9: Technical staff without requisite qualifications

Sl. No	Parent section	Post	Section in which working currently	Qualification Required for the section in which working currently	Qualification possessed
1	Biology	Assistant Director	Cyber Forensics	M.Sc (Computer Science/ Forensic Science/ Electronics/IT) or M.Tech	Ph.D, M.Sc (Zoology)
2	Biology	Scientific Officer	Questioned Documents	M.Sc (Physics/Chemistry)	M.Sc (Zoology)
3	Biology	Scientific Assistant	Questioned Documents	M.Sc (Physics/Chemistry)	M.Sc (Zoology)
4	Photography	3 Scientific Assistants	Cyber Forensics	M.Sc (Computer Science/ Forensic Science/ Electronics/IT) or M.Tech	Diploma in Cinematography

(Source: Information furnished by Director, FSL)

¹⁶ Each case involves various exhibits viz., material evidences, which require analysis.

Since the qualifications of the technical staff were not as per the requirement, it could adversely affect the quality of work output of FSL.

The Government replied (December 2017) that all the posting of the staff was based on the earlier C&R Rules, 2001. Though it was stated that C&R Rules was revised in 2017, it was silent on the action being taken in this regard.

2.1.12.4 Non-functioning of finger print scanner system

In test-checked police stations, the live finger print scanners issued for online transmission of finger print impressions to the district finger print bureau were not functioning due to software compatibility issues. Review of the records of the Director, Finger Print Bureau revealed that 226 finger print scanner systems¹⁷ were procured at a cost of ₹5.17 crore and issued (2008-11) to various police stations in the State. Since upgrading of the software/servers and replacing of scanners was still at tendering stage (October 2017), an amount of ₹10.00 crore allotted (January 2013) for the above project remained unutilised with KSPHC. In the absence of the above facility, the police stations were manually collecting the finger print data and physically handing it over to the Finger Print Bureau, which was not only time consuming but also less accurate.

The Government replied (December 2017) that the Live scanner AMC was given to a firm in September 2017 and the process of restoration and maintenance was initiated. It also stated that tender process for upgradation of software was awaiting SLEC approval.

Recommendation-8: Shortages of technical staff should be addressed to expedite the clearance of pending cases in FSLs.

2.1.13 Training

Training is essential to impart knowledge and professional skills to police personnel and to keep pace with fast growing challenges. There are 13 Police training academy/schools apart from district training centres functioning in the State. The training schools impart basic training, refresher courses, short-term courses, in-service training, *etc.* The deficiencies noticed during audit are discussed below:

2.1.13.1 Non-availability/non-functioning of equipment in training centres

- Against the minimum requirement of five weapons of each category as prescribed by BPR&D, the actual availability of weapons is indicated in **Table-2.10**.

¹⁷ Includes finger print scanner, web camera and laser printer along with live scan software.

Table-2.10: Availability of weapons in the test-checked training centres

Sl.No.	Training institutes	0.303 Drill Purpose Rifle	Truncated 0.303" rifle	Verey Light Pistols	37/38mm Tear Gas Gun	12 Bore Pump action
1.	Karnataka Police Academy (KPA), Mysuru	Nil	Nil	02	04	59
2.	Police Training Centre, Kalaburagi	Nil	Nil	Nil	02	Nil
3.	Police Training School, Khanapur	Nil	01	Nil	02	03

(Source: Information furnished by test-checked training centres)

From **Table-2.10**, it is evident that the training institutes were short of essential weapons (except for 12 Bore pump action in KPA, Mysuru) for trainees as prescribed by BPR&D. DP Rifles which were essential for arms drill/passing out parade were unavailable in all training centres.

The Government replied (December 2017) that in response to requests of training institutions to supply arms and ammunitions for training purpose, the training institutes were directed to borrow arms and ammunitions from the concerned District Police/KSRP on temporary basis as and when required.

- In PTS Khanapur, the obstacles used for outdoor trainings such as climbing rope, manila rope, monkey crawl and Burma Bridge were in unserviceable condition. Though the situation was reported (August 2016) by the Chief Drill Instructor to SP and Principal, no action was initiated for its repair. Hence, the obstacle classes, which were vital for enhancing the endurance and physical strength of the trainees were not conducted.

The Government replied (December 2017) that the obstacles were since repaired and were in good condition.

- Fire arms simulator training is a cost effective means of teaching individual/police force a broad range of modern weapons and cognitive skills. Fire arms simulator (one each) provided during 2002-2005 to the three test-checked training institutes were not functioning and since the AMC was not renewed, the required repair works were not carried out. This resulted in the trainees not being trained in various modern weapons.

The Government replied (December 2017) that since the existing simulators were very old and unserviceable, the proposal for purchase of new simulators for training institutions was in progress.

2.1.13.2 New Training centres without infrastructure

Government of Karnataka accorded (July 2015) sanction for establishing six¹⁸ new PTS. Even though one batch of constables passed out from each PTS since November 2015, these training centres were functioning without basic facilities required for training centres (31 March 2017) as detailed below:

¹⁸ Hubballi-Dharwad, Mysuru, Hassan, Kadur, Aimangala and Thanisandra.

- Since no vendors participated in the short term tenders called for procuring obstacles to the newly established training schools, the amount (₹65.00 lakh) allocated for procurement of obstacles was utilised for procurement of ineligible items under the MPF scheme viz., writing boards, water purifiers and desk with benches. Thus, the basic training was completed in the above training centres in the absence of these obstacles, which were training aids to ensure physical agility and endurance.
- Though DP rifles were prescribed for training by BPR&D, the same were not available in any of the training institutions.
- In the training syllabus, minimum of fifteen rounds of firing with 0.303 Rifles/7.62 SLR was prescribed. However, in the three¹⁹ new PTS, ammunitions required for the said training in firing were not supplied.

Hence, almost after two years since inception of these training institutions, department failed to provide the basic infrastructure and facilities required for effectively imparting the basic training.

The Government replied (December 2017) that for time being, in cases where obstacle training equipment was not available in new training schools, training on obstacles was being provided in nearby schools/KSRP/District/City police units. It was also stated that a proposal would be sent for supply of DP rifles.

2.1.13.3 Shortage of Training instructors

BPR&D in its concept paper on norms for assuring police training capacity in India, prescribed (2009) the desired minimum number of trainers for both indoor and outdoor activities in PTCs. As per these norms, one SI/Jamedar and two head constables are required for outdoor training of each platoon consisting of 30 trainees and for every three platoons, one police inspector is required apart from the supervising/supporting staff.

In two test-checked training institutes (PTC Kalaburagi and PTS Khanapur), audit analysed the staff strength available with the number²⁰ of trainees, who attended the basic training course and found that available strength of the outdoor trainers were short of prescribed norms as detailed in **Table-2.11**.

Table-2.11: Outdoor Training instructors available in training institutes

Training Institute	Training Instructors Required			Training Instructors available		
	Inspector	Sub inspector	Head constable	Inspector	Sub inspector	Head constable
PTC Kalaburagi (15 platoons [#])	5	15	30	2	3	25*
PTS Khanapur (11 platoons [#])	3	11	22	1	2	09

(Source: Information furnished by the Training centres)

[#] 30 trainees per platoon

*includes officials from KSRP and District Armed Reserve

¹⁹ Mysuru, Hubballi-Dharwad and Aimangala.

²⁰ The analysis was carried out in respect of the batches, in which maximum number of trainees attended, i.e., at PTC Kalaburagi (437 trainee APC from 10-02-2014 to 9-8-2014) and PTS Khanapura (337 trainee APC from 05-11-2012 to 23-08-2013).

Since basic training is an important aspect of moulding a police officer and requires attention and supervision, shortage of trainers was likely to have an adverse effect on the quality of training imparted.

The Government replied (December 2017) that action was being taken in this regard.

2.1.13.4 Training in handling modern weapons

Though the State was procuring AK-47 Rifles since 2004, the training syllabus for PSIs was revised only in December 2015 to include training and firing of modern weapons. However, we observed that the firing practice for SI Trainees during October 2015 to October 2016 was conducted in KPA, Mysuru using 7.62 mm SLR, 0.303 Rifles and 9 mm pistol only and not with modern weapons even though AK-47 Rifles were available. Thus, the basic training of PSIs were completed without providing exposure in handling of modern weapons.

The Government replied (December 2017) that the number of AK-47 and INSAS available in the training institutes were meagre when compared to number of trainees. It also stated that action was being taken to prepare a consolidated proposal for the procurement of modern weapons for all the training schools.

2.1.13.5 Shortage in annual firing practice

As per the instructions issued by DG&IGP (October 2011) with regard to firing practice, firing practice was to be carried out twice a year. However, we observed that the firing practice was not carried out in Belagavi district during 2012-14 and was carried out only once a year in Udupi district. Irregular conducting of firing practice was detrimental to the preparedness of police forces for attending emergency situations.

Further, there was huge shortage in attendance of officials during the annual firing practice as detailed in **Appendix-2.6**, particularly in Belagavi district, where the firing practice was attended by less than 50 *per cent* of the police personnel each year.

One of the reasons for the low turnout for the firing practice was the absence of dedicated firing ranges. Three²¹ out of eight test-checked districts did not have their own firing ranges for conducting the firing practice. In Belagavi district, firing practice was conducted utilising the firing ranges of the army and CRPF. In Mysuru district, firing practice was conducted utilising the range under the control of Mandya district. In Tumakuru district firing practice was presently being conducted in private land even though five acres of Government land was allotted (April 2015) to the department. In the absence of adequate facility, firing practice was to be conducted within the time allotted for utilising the firing ranges, which were owned by the Army/other districts/ private persons. It was observed in the test-checked districts/CoPs

²¹ Belagavi, Mysuru and Tumakuru.

that only one day was allotted to each station for firing practice and the police personnel who were allotted mandatory duties/emergency duties could not attend the practice sessions.

Recommendation-9: It should be ensured that training institutions are equipped adequately with modern systems and outdoor instructors to impart quality training to state police personnel.

2.1.14 Special Police Forces

The State Government established several special police forces/ units *viz.*, Anti Naxal Force, Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT), Anti-Sabotage Check unit, Coastal Police Stations *etc.* Audit observations on the working of these Special Forces/Units are discussed below.

2.1.14.1 Coastal Police Stations

The Coastal Police Stations (CPS) were established under the Coastal Security Scheme (2005-06) with the intention of strengthening infrastructure for patrolling and surveillance of territorial waters (*i.e.*, up to 12 nautical miles from the shore), to check and counter any illegal cross-border and criminal activities using the coast or the sea. There were nine CPSs working in Karnataka. A review of the functioning of CPS revealed the following:

- There existed acute shortage of staff in CPS. Out of the total sanctioned strength of 438 police personnel under various cadres, only 170 personnel were working *i.e.* 39 *per cent* of the sanctioned strength. Vacancies were acute in the cadres of PSIs and Police Constables (PCs), where only two and 30 posts respectively were filled as of March 2017 against sanctioned posts of 47 PSI and 189 PC. The Government replied (December 2017) that all the posts were to be filled up through deputation and requests to fill up the post were made to all units.
- Similarly, huge vacancies existed in the cadre of technical staff, which included ship captain, motor launch mechanic, engine drivers *etc.* Out of 118 sanctioned posts in the technical cadre, only 31 posts were filled. In test-checked Malpe CPS, two ship captains were working on contract basis for the allotted three boats with the result that efficient boat patrolling in three shifts could not be carried out. The Government replied (December 2017) that it was difficult to find technical staff who were willing to work on consolidated salary and hence, revision of consolidated pay was under consideration.
- Out of nine CPS, four did not have any patrolling boats. In the remaining five CPS, though 15 boats were available for patrolling, three boats were under repair for periods ranging from 3 to 11 months and one boat was not operational due to a fire accident (December 2014). In reply, Government stated (December 2017) that in the second phase, though 12 boats were allocated, these were yet to be supplied by MHA.
- As per the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) prescribed for coastal security, each CPS should have its own jetty for maintaining secrecy of operations and for the security of boats. However, none of CPS in the State

had their own jetty, even though land was identified in respect of eight CPS. The boats of the department were presently docked in jetties of port department/fisheries department/private hangers without any formal written agreement.

The Government replied (December 2017) that under Coastal Security Scheme II, land was allotted to seven CPS for construction of jetty. Further, it stated that the time frame for implementing the scheme was extended upto March 2020.

- As per SOP, police personnel posted in CPS had to be provided with training on specialised sea faring courses. However, in the test-checked Malpe CPS, we observed that none of the police personnel working were imparted such specialised training. Further, in respect of Hejmadi CPS, only four out of 15 working police personnel were provided with such training. The Government replied (December 2017) that the police personnel who work on deputation basis in CPS for five years are transferred back to their parent unit and those newly deputed were to be trained. Hence, training was a continuous process.
- Due to the shortage of personnel, in the test-checked CPS, only two police personnel were provided per patrolling boat, as against five police personnel prescribed in SOP. Further only one Sub-machine Gun was provided per patrolling boat, though SOP prescribed arms for all the crew members and police personnel involved in patrolling. The Government replied (December 2017) that on improvement in the staff position, the deployment as per SOP would be followed.
- SOP prescribed a common communication channel for the coastal police with coastguard/navy for effective coordination and security. However, no communication channel was provided for the patrolling boats available with the coastal police. The Government replied (December 2017) that tender process for installation of VHF set towers, *etc.*, for common communication system was under process.

2.1.14.2 Special Weapons and Tactics Team

To enhance the scope of armed response at the level of all police units, Special Weapons and Tactics teams (SWAT) were constituted (January 2015) in all districts with the objective to act as ‘first responder’ in crisis emanating from acts of terror, naxalism, organised crime and underworld activities. Though the teams were formed in all districts, we observed that the objectives of their formation were not fulfilled due to the following reasons:

- The officials nominated for SWAT team had to undergo training at Centre for Counter Terrorism (CCT), Kudlu. The details of training imparted to SWAT team at various Range/Commissionerate are detailed in **Table-2.12**.

Table-2.12: Details of training imparted to SWAT team

Sl. No.	Range /Commissionerate	Strength of SWAT	No of officials trained	Percentage
1.	Commissionerate (3 CAR in Bengaluru & 4 CoP)	210	58	28
2.	Central range (7 districts)	174	48	28
3.	Southern range (6 districts)	150	47	31
4.	Western range (4 districts)	96	34	35
5.	Eastern range (5 districts)	126	41	33
6.	Ballari range (3 districts)	72	15	21
7.	Northern range (5 districts)	120	45	38

(Source: Information furnished by DGP (ISD))

From the table, it is evident that only 21 to 38 *per cent* of SWAT team personnel were trained in specialised courses.

- SOP for SWAT clearly stipulated that SWAT personnel must fire their primary (rifle/carbine) and secondary weapons (pistols) minimum five days a week. In three²² test-checked units, we observed that the firing practice was carried out only twice a year along with other regular police personnel. Further, we noticed that even though SWAT team was trained in modern weapons *viz.*, AK 47, INSAS *etc.*, the team was provided with only 0.303/SLR during their annual practice.
- SOP also provided for conducting tactical reconnaissance of all vital installations, places with high footfalls and any other likely terror targets in the unit's jurisdiction in order to check the operational readiness of the force. It further stipulated that this reconnaissance report was to be shared with ISD and CCT control rooms by email/fax. Audit observed that no such reports were sent by SWAT units. In its absence, it could not be ascertained if tactical reconnaissance were being conducted regularly.

Hence, though initiative was taken to establish a specialised team in January 2015 to counter terrorist threats, it was yet to become a striking unit as intended.

The Government replied (December 2017) that against 690 slots allotted for training during the period May 2014 to August 2017, 437 personnel were trained in SWAT courses. Further, it stated that standard operating procedures would be followed henceforth in respect of firing practice as well as tactical reece of all vital installations.

2.1.14.3 Anti-Sabotage Check Wing

Anti-Sabotage Check (ASC) wing was constituted in each district to carry out initial/routine checks to negate any sabotage attempt and to detect any explosives/bombs in vital locations.

Based on the records/information made available to audit and field visits of test-checked units the following observations are offered:

²² Mysuru SP, Tumakuru SP and Mysuru CoP.

- Though ASC wings were functioning in all districts as a part of District Armed Reserve, required strength of each team were not finalised and sanctioned. As a result, Audit could not analyse the effectiveness of the wing in terms of working strength. The department stated (November 2017) that the teams were formed based on need/local situation. The reply was not acceptable as ASC wing which was to conduct routine checks could not work on *ad hoc*/temporary working strength.
- As the primary duty of ASC wing includes detection of explosives, it needs to be equipped with appropriate equipment. But as seen from the test-checked districts, all the explosive testing kits had expired during the period 2011-13. Prescribed equipment like Non-Linear Junction Detector (NLJD) and explosive detectors were also not provided. In the Exit Conference (November 2017) it was stated that action was initiated to procure the equipment.
- All district ASC wings were supplied with equipment like Door Frame Metal Detector (DFMD), Hand Held Metal Detector (HHMD) and Deep Search Metal Detector (DSMD). Though the department procured 40 DSMDs and 120 DFMDs during 2012-17, the wings proposed 207 HHMDs, 105 DFMDs and 38 DSMDs for condemnation as well. Out of test-checked eight districts and one CoP, there were less than or equal to 70 *per cent* working HHMDs in four test-checked districts and one CoP. Similarly, in four test-checked districts the percentage of working DFMDs was less than 70 *per cent* as detailed in **Appendix-2.7**.

2.1.14.4 Anti Naxal Force

In the State, 14 Anti Naxal Force (ANF) camps were functioning which carried out routine combing operations in their range of operation. As such, the personnel of ANF were required to be trained in specialised courses such as counter insurgency, jungle warfare *etc.* However, we observed that in all the 14 camps, less than 50 *per cent* of the personnel were trained in such specialised training as detailed in **Appendix-2.8**. In Thirumani camp, we observed that none of the police personnel were provided specialised training courses. The reasons for inadequate training for ANF personnel could be attributed to non-establishment of dedicated training centre for ANF which is discussed below:

- **Delay in establishment of Jungle Camp Unit at Karkala**

The Department proposed (May 2014) establishment of Jungle Combat Unit at Kukkindoor near Karkala. The estimated cost for establishment of the training centre was ₹2.02 crore. The proposal was submitted (June 2014) to Government for its approval.

On receipt of permission of DGP, ISD (June 2014), the Department started construction of barracks for officers at first floor of the office building (₹27 lakh), training room (₹21 lakh) and barracks, kitchen and dining room for the trainees (₹50 lakh). The funds were released to Project Director, Nirmithi Kendra, Udupi district and while the construction of barracks, kitchen and dining room was completed by June 2016, the construction of training room

was yet to be completed (August 2016). Further, other basic infrastructural facilities such as water sump, toilets, obstacles track, fencing, drainage *etc.*, were not taken up. ISD wing requested (January 2017) additional funds amounting to ₹100.50 lakh for completing the above works and making the training centre operational.

Thus, construction of training centre on piecemeal basis without preparing a comprehensive plan resulted in non-establishment of the training centre for ANF forces.

The Government replied (December 2017) that the required infrastructure would be provided once funds are sanctioned.

Recommendation-10: Vacancies in coastal police stations should be filled in time bound manner to ensure effective coastal policing and prevention of illegal cross border and criminal activities.

Recommendation-11: Requisite specialised training for all the personnel deployed in Coastal police, SWAT and ANF are to be imparted in order to achieve the objective of setting up such Special Forces.

Recommendation-12: The State Government may consider creating permanent cadres for special police units instead of filling up posts through deputation for short periods in order to retain specially trained personnel.

2.1.15 Megacity Policing

2.1.15.1 Delay in implementation of Megacity Policing

GoI introduced Megacity Policing as a sub-plan under MPF scheme from 2005-06 with a view to enable police to counter specific problems of crime investigation, up-gradation of control room and installation of digital radio trunking²³ *etc.* During 2013-2015, Bengaluru city was allocated ₹80.49 crore, which included both GoI and GoK share for CCTV surveillance, Command and Control Centre, Fusion/Data Centre²⁴, Up-gradation of Dial 100 centre, Highway Patrol Vehicles and Community Policing.

Against the said allocation, while GoI released (December 2014) ₹48.30 crore, the State Government released (February 2016 and September 2016) ₹32.19 crore. However, the scheme was yet to be completed and the progress of scheme is detailed in **Table-2.13**.

²³ Radio trunking system is a two-way radio system that uses a control channel to automatically direct radio traffic.

²⁴ Data centre stores and handles data, which come to the control room for analysis to detect, prevent, apprehend and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. The fusion centre collate, categorise, analyse and subsequently convert unstructured information collected from different sources into meaningful and actionable intelligence.

Table-2.13: Implementation of Megacity Policing

Name of the component	Allocation (₹in crore)	Expenditure (₹in crore)	State of implementation
CCTV Surveillance	37.11	27.56	The tender had been finalised and supply order issued on 4 October 2016. CCTV cameras were installed in 579 locations with power cabling provided to 351 cameras and BSNL connectivity provided to 467 cameras. The work which was to be completed by April 2017 was under progress (November 2017).
Command Control Centre, Fusion data Centre and Upgradation of Dial 100 Centre	28.23	21.12	An amount of ₹1.57 crore was utilised for installation of GPS telematic services, Bengaluru city digital maps, AVLS software and server hardware in connection with up gradation of Dial 100 Centre. Further, an amount of ₹2.81 crore was utilised for purchase of 250 Mobile Data Terminals to be installed in the patrol vehicles. Tender for setting up the Command Control Centre was finalised and supply order for ₹23.85 crore was issued during January 2017. The work which was to be completed by April 17 is under progress (November 2017).
High Way Patrol Vehicles	14.65	14.65	Utilised for procurement of 222 numbers of Maruti Suzuki Ertiga PCR vans.
Community Policing	0.50	Nil	The non-technological components of the scheme such as Community Policing, reaching out through educational system, training on soft skills <i>etc</i> were yet to be carried out.
Total	80.49	63.33	

From the table, it is evident that though the scheme was to be implemented during 2013-14 and 2014-15, tender for CCTV surveillance and Command Control Centre was finalised and supply order issued during October 2016 and January 2017 respectively. Further, community policing concept was yet to be implemented.

The Government replied (December 2017) that the balance funds would be utilised by end of 2017-18.

However, delay in implementation of the scheme resulted in non-achievement of objective of providing the city police with extensive CCTV surveillance and upgraded Dial 100 system for more than two years.

2.1.16 Conclusion

The State Government should give utmost importance to strengthening its police force as the police population ratio in the state is below par. We observed that there were deficiencies at planning, implementation and monitoring stages of the scheme. Annual Action Plans were submitted with delays ranging between 126 days and 245 days, which in turn delayed approval of AAP and release of funds. Delay in receipt of funds from GoI and further delay by the State Government to release funds to the department resulted in non-utilisation of funds in respective plan year and subsequent loss of central grants due to poor pace of utilisation.

Physical infrastructure in the 60 test-checked police stations was inadequate with respect to facilities like barracks, toilets, witness examination rooms, strong rooms for arms *etc*. In terms of weaponry, we observed a mismatch between availability of arms and ammunition in test-checked police stations.

There was a shortage in availability of modern weapons when compared with BPR&D norms.

With regard to Mobility, we observed that there was hardly any improvement in number of vehicles available as the condemnation of old and obsolete vehicles far exceeded the new vehicles being purchased. All the communication sets available with the Department were analog and reached their maximum lifespan and hence were required to be condemned. Due to delay in obtaining WOL for digital equipment, the Department could not procure modern digital communication equipment nor could it put to use the equipment already procured.

Trainees were deprived of training in various modern weapons due to non-functioning of fire arms simulator in the training institute. Training schools/centres were functioning without necessary obstacles required for outdoor training. The Special Forces *viz.*, Coastal Police Stations, Special weapons and tactics team and Anti Naxal Force are neither equipped nor trained to the optimal extent.

There was a delay in implementation of the megacity policing and the scheme, which was to be completed by 2015, was not completed even after lapse of two years. Hence, upgradation of control room which was one of the major objectives of the scheme is still in its nascent stage.

Thus, the intended objective of modernising the police force was not fully achieved on account of sub-optimal performance in procurement of weapons and communication equipment as well as shortfall in training of police forces.